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           Repeated statements are more likely to be judged as true compared to statements 
that have not been repeated. This phenomenon in known as the Illusion of Truth effect. 
The most studied theory is that fluency induced by repetition gives an illusion that 
otherwise ambiguous statements are truthful. The two experiments in this dissertation 
tested the possibility that fluency might be supplemented by information about 
plausibility – that is, the presence or absence of relevant information in memory. The 
main dependent variable for the experiments was truth-confidence rating, which was a 
composite of the truth value and the confidence level for each rating reaction time. 
Various measures and manipulations of fluency (e.g., clarity, number of propositions, 
repetition) and plausibility (e.g., proposition plausibility, content valence) were included. 
Experiment 1 showed that despite repeated exposure of similar lexical features, contents 
that contradicted the target statement decreased truth-confidence ratings. Experiment 2 
showed that the minimum plausibility rating of the propositions was a better predictor of 
veracity judgments compared to any of the reaction time measures. The results suggest 
that plausibility could be an important contributing factor in the Illusion of Truth effect, 
and possibly other related effects as well. 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Imagine that your friend tells you that he thinks that Elvis Pressley is still alive 
and living in Greensboro.  How is it that we are so quickly able to reject this claim, 
without any apparent retrieval of other facts?  It could be true, but it’s probably not – and 
we can assess that fact very quickly on the basis of our other knowledge.  Similarly, if I 
say that coffee is a popular drink in Trinidad, you may find this very plausible and likely 
to be true even if you lack any first-hand knowledge about coffee in Trinidad.  How do 
we make these kinds of quick decisions about what is true and false when we don’t know 
for sure?  
One answer is that we use information about how easily we can process a claim to 
decide its truthfulness. This theory arose to explain Hasher, Goldstein, and Toppino’s 
(1977) illusion of truth effect with ambiguous statements (i.e., statements where the 
actual veracity was unknown). They found that repeated statements were more likely to 
be judged as true compared to statements that were only presented during the second 
session (i.e., new), regardless of the actual statement veracity. In other words, ambiguous 
information was mistaken for true when it was repeated. The illusion of truth effect has 
been replicated many times since then, and the dominant view has been that repetition 
makes the item easier to process (fluent) than ambiguous statements that were not  
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relationship between the item and other information in a person’s experience that controls 
decisions about truth for ambiguous items.  
Besides one very recent development (specifically, the referential theory of 
Unkelbach & Rom, 2017), the currently dominant view of the cause of illusion of truth is 
based on fluency. Fluency theories proposes that as statements are repeated, they become 
easier to process, and consequently are judged as more likely to be true (e.g., Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Koch & Forgas, 2012; Killer, Lloyd, & Westerman, 2008; Shapiro, 
1999; Scholl, Griefender, & Bless, 2014; Sunbar, Kardes, &Wright, 2015; Unkelbach, 
2007; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009; Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011). 
Consistent with this view, other research shows that the exact statements need not be 
repeated, and merely exposing the participants to a relevant information can induce the 
same effect (e.g., Arkes et al., 1991; Ozubko & Fugelsang, 2011). For example, when 
shown information related to China that was irrelevant to the target statement, 
participants were likely to judge the target statement to be more truthful.  Furthermore, 
simply making statements more legible induces inflated truth judgments (e.g., Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999). Participants were more likely to judge a statement as true when the font 
size was bigger, when the stimuli rhyme (e.g., McGlone & Tofigbakhsh, 2000), and when 
the speaker was more confident and articulate when describing the same information as 
opposed to mumbling it (Brennan & Williams, 1995; Zürn, & Topolinski, 2017).   
However, the illusion of truth is a very large, robust effect, and there may be 
additional mechanisms that contribute to the effect.  In this project, I tested the 
plausibility of an additional mechanism: one based on plausibility.  Specifically, I suggest 
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that when we encounter a statement and need to judge whether or not it is true, we do a 
fast comparison with information that is readily available in memory, and to the degree 
that it is consistent, we judge statements to be more likely to be true. Plausibility 
produces the illusion of truth because the best match for a statement is often the same 
information, particularly if it was seen recently and frequently. However, other relevant 
information might also affect our truth judgments. I do not intend to argue that fluency 
plays no role in illusion of truth; however, I think plausibility may sometimes provide as 
much or more information than fluency.  
One can wonder why illusion of truth research was not directed along this path 
earlier. Is plausibility another term to describe what researchers have been calling 
conceptual fluency (i.e., the content of the item is easily processed)? One possibility is 
that using related information is often slow, because it takes time to retrieve relevant 
information and logically weight it to use as a basis of judgment. Indeed, central route 
persuasion is often a slow process of reasoning through the available evidence about a 
claim (e.g., Kahnemann, 2011; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), entailing systematic retrieval 
and evaluation of concepts. In contrast to this slow, deliberative approach, I proposed that 
the speed to make a plausibility judgment can sometimes be quick and intuitive. Later, I 
will argue that earlier plausibility judgment work by Reder (1982) with sentence 
verification supports the possibility that we can make quick, intuitive truth judgments 
based on a very rapid plausibility evaluation, and then use it as basis for making such 
judgments.  
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Thus, the two main variables necessary to dissociate fluency and the plausibility 
account are speed and content—speed being the time it takes for one to process an item 
and content being the relevant information that is highly available in memory. I propose 
that the content of the statement is important: people will need to pool relevant 
information that they know of to make judgment based on plausibility. Furthermore, I 
propose that such plausibility judgments are made quickly and are a primary source of 
truth judgments. However, this is not what the fluency account would predict: content is 
less important as long as the statement is easily processed. In the following sections of 
the paper, I will review the evidence for the fluency account in more detail, and then 
argue that our use of ambiguous, novel statements has prevented us from testing 
alternative accounts to the fluency account and proposed to test the relative value of 
fluency and plausibility accounts.  
Support for the Fluency Account 
The fluency account has been very successful in providing explanations for 
phenomena in illusion of truth (e.g., Dechêne et al., 2010).  It assumes that people do not 
scrutinize the statements too deeply, but rather make a kind of snap judgment based on 
how easily the statement is processed.  One piece of evidence that repetition can be 
driven by fluency or familiarity is that the effects of repetition on judgments are not just 
limited to belief judgments (e.g., Bruett & Leynes, 2015; Garcia-Marquez, Prada, & 
Mackie, 2016; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008). Similar effects are observed in other types of 
judgments. For instance, the when an item is repeatedly presented, the item is more 
preferred to in comparison to new items (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Foster, Fabi, & Leder, 
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2015; Moreland & Topolinski, 2010; Zajonc, 1968) and repeatedly presented problems 
are more likely to induce higher judgments of insight (e.g, Topolinski & Strack, 2009; 
Topolinski & Reber, 2010). 
More broadly, fluency is part of a family of effects that occur with little conscious 
thinking.  As Kahnemann (2011) described, there are often two modes of thinking: 
System 1 and System 2. System 1 is an automatic system that operates with little to no 
effort quickly which means it lacks any voluntary control on our part, whereas System 2 
is an effortful system that needs concentration, attention allocation, and effortful 
processing to allow for complex thinking. So, in the illusion of truth paradigm, those who 
judged the statements to be true after repetition even though they are false are engaging 
in a System 1 processing. The statement is no longer novel but familiar, so without 
scrutinizing the statements’ validity – System 2 would do the scrutinizing – System 1 
would help the participants conclude that the statement is true.  
Consistent with a role of System 1 in making truth judgments, when conscious 
resources are reduced the illusion of truth increases.  For example, when participants are 
taxed with an attention-dividing task (e.g., Skurnick, Yoon, Park, & Schwartz, 2005) or 
when the participants lack motivation for further thinking (e.g, Garcia-Marques, Silva, & 
Mello, 2016) they are more likely to judge repeated statements as true compared to those 
who had full mental capacity and motivation during judgment. So, it is not hard to agree 
that the “illusory” part of the illusion of truth phenomenon is that participants are not 
fully scrutinizing the validity judgment of the statements. Instead, the illusory sense of 
familiarity induced by repetition is causing the truth judgment inflation.  
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Before the fluency account, people explained the illusion of truth in terms of item 
familiarity and its dissociation from the source of the items (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Begg, 
Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Henkel & Mattson, 2011; Parks & Toth, 2006). They assumed 
that there is a sense of familiarity that repetition brings to the statement which separates 
the repeated statement from the novel statement (e.g., Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), and 
the sense of familiarity is not tied to a valid reason, so it can easily be attributed to 
anything: in this case to being a true statement (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Kelley & 
Rhodes, 2002; Scholl, Griefeneder, & Bless, 2014; Wang, Brashier, Wing, Marsh, & 
Cabeza, 2016). For example, when the participants see a statement repeatedly along with 
an indication about its actual veracity (i.e., if it is true or false), they are more likely to 
remember the veracity value along with the statement, allowing them to give a correct 
truth judgment even after a week (e.g., Brown & Nix, 1996). However, when asked to 
rate the veracity after three months, the veracity value (i.e., that the statement is false) 
was lost, but the feeling of familiarity towards the statement remained, leading the 
participant to judge the statement to be true.         
The field later began to refer to these familiarity effects as arising from fluency.  
What Dechêne and colleagues (2010) call fluency is what Kahnemann (2011) would call 
cognitive ease. When there is less effort required or any need for strained attention and 
control, it is easy to process (i.e., fluent). When it requires elaborate thinking as it 
requires systematic cognition, it is hard to process (i.e., disfluent). The fluency account 
suggests that items that are repeated are more easily processed (i.e., fluent) and are 
therefore judged as more truthful than those that are not repeated (e.g., Dechêne, Stahl, 
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Hansen, & Wänke, 2009). The fluency account proposed that a fluent statement is 
associated with truth and therefore more likely true and a disfluent statement is associated 
the untruth and therefore judged as false (Schwarz, 2004; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Killer, Lloyd, & Westerman, 2008; Wänke, & Hansen, 2015; Westerman, Lenska, & 
Olds, 2015; Whittlesea, 2002). Their idea is that fluent material must mean there is ample 
frequency of past exposure to the idea. When people lack memory regarding the sources 
of the repetitions, it may be taken to imply a social consensus (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnick, & Yoon, 2007; Bacon, 1979), and social consensus 
means a higher probability of the material being true.  
A more recent development in the fluency theory emphasizes that there must be 
relative/unexpected fluency differences between the repeated statements and the new 
statements to observe the effect (e.g., Dechêne et al., 2009, 2010; Hansen, Dechêne, & 
Wänke, 2008; Jiang & Hong, 2014; Ozubko & Joordens, 2007). This is especially 
prominent in a within-list design, where there are repeated statements and new statements 
in the same list, as opposed to a between-list design. The repeated statements are at an 
advantage as they are relatively more fluent than statements that are new. As the 
participants are unaware of why they are more fluent (i.e., they do not recall that they 
were repeated), the participants infer that the fluent statements must be true.  
In conclusion, the fluency account is now well-established and explained in ways 
that are similar to other cognitive phenomena, such as the mere exposure effect (e.g., 
Zajonc, 1968) and the false fame effect (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989).  
There have been few serious challenges to the fluency account (e.g., Unkelbach & Rom, 
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2017), and it does a good job of explaining why the judgments can be made quickly, and 
why they are sensitive to repetition.  
Stimulus Ambiguity and Novelty as Limitations on Tests of Alternative Accounts 
In this section, I will argue that content is an important piece for understanding 
the illusion of truth effect, but the way previous researchers have studied illusion of truth 
prevented observing such effects.  The plausibility account assumes that we can quickly 
compare novel information to highly available and relevant knowledge, and that when 
there are many repetitions of a given statement, it tends to be the most highly available 
information.  Thus, I will argue that the use of only ambiguous statements and mostly 
exact repetitions rather than providing relevant information made it impossible to 
distinguish the contributions of fluency and plausibility.   
In the plausibility account, when asked to make a truth judgment about a 
statement, what one knows about the statement primarily determines the answer as shown 
in the meta-analysis. If she knows that the earth is round, no matter how many times “the 
earth is flat” is presented, the answer will always be false because a vast number of 
earlier contradictory statements exist in our memories that are readily available. 
However, when there is no relevant knowledge about whether the statement is true or 
false, repeating it (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Hasher et al., 1977; Garcia-Marquez et al., 2016; 
Moritz et al., 2012) or reading relevant information (e.g., Arkes et al., 1991) makes the 
statement itself the most available information about it, so it seems true. For example, 
when she is not sure how much percentage of the air is nitrogen but does know that there 
is nitrogen in the air, then when the statement “nitrogen has a volume of 48%” is 
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repeatedly shown, she is likely to judge it as true even though it is wrong (the correct 
answer is 78%). The judgment is likely to depend on what she knows about the subject 
when she does not have a definitive answer of right or wrong. It is likely that such 
judgments are based on how plausible the statement is given what she already knows 
about the subject matter.  In fact, that was how illusion of truth researchers explicitly 
excluded information for which we already knew the answer, because then people could 
just retrieve that the statement was true or false (e.g., Hasher et al., 1977; Bacon, 1979). 
And the meta-analysis found that the actual veracity does not affect the subsequent truth 
judgment as much as the repetition of the statements if the statements were ambiguous in 
their veracity (Dechêne et al., 2010). This suggests that participants can determine the 
obviously true and false statements, since repetition of the statements only affected 
participants when the statements could be judged as either true or false.  
 However, there are some studies that show blatantly false statements (e.g., Lead is 
lighter than Aluminum) can sometimes be judged as true even when people have the 
knowledge to retrieve the correct answer when asked to do so. For example, Fazio and 
colleagues (2015) found that people will erroneously judge a false statement (e.g., Sari is 
the short-pleated skirt worn by Scottish men) to be true with repetition even if they could 
correctly answer the question (e.g., kilt). Even though people have the knowledge of the 
statements, there can be a partial and “good enough” match—possibly even driven by a 
sense of fluency—that leads participants to incorrectly accept the statements as true. 
Similarly, in the Moses-illusion effect, people are likely to answer “two” when asked 
“How many animals did Moses bring into the ark?” even though it was Noah (not Moses) 
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who built an ark (Erickson & Mattson, 1981). The partial match of the Moses being a 
biblical figure such as Noah is what likely drives the erroneous response.  
Expertise may also affect illusion of truth, because experts may have enough 
available content knowledge to avoid the partial match.  Fazio and colleagues (2015) 
said, “We expected that participants would draw on their knowledge, regardless of 
fluency, if statements contained implausible errors (pp. 1000).” A critical point is that 
plausibility is a subjective and idiosyncratic matter. Psychology majors who had taken at 
least two psychology courses still showed an illusion of truth effect for false claims about 
psychology (Boehm, 1994). For those who have taken an introductory class and maybe 
another core course, they knew “just enough to be dangerous.” However, according to 
Fazio et al.’s logic, psychology professors should likely show no illusion of truth effect 
for false psychology statements, because they are very implausible given their extensive 
relevant knowledge. Instead of knocking on every professor’s door to test this, I proposed 
to use fluent but varying content valence as statement manipulation for one of the studies 
(Experiment 1). For example, “Ivan Pavlov studied behavior conditioning through the 
saliva collected from a dog” is used as a target sentence. I could use sentences that have 
some features of the statement that are repeated and therefore fluent in processing but 
differ in terms of its support for the target statement (e.g., dogs salivate when hungry vs. 
there is an unpleasant odor found in dogs’ saliva).  
  I proposed that the content knowledge of the statements is an important piece in 
understanding truth judgments. Whatever is plausible to the participant is likely to be 
judged as true. For instance, in a study using participants with high schizotypy and those 
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without, participants with low schizotypy were mostly unaffected by repeating paranoid 
statements (e.g., The Russian government spies on their citizens through multiple 
surveillance cameras) compared to the participants with high schizotypy (Moritz et al., 
2012). To the participants with high schizotypy, the paranoid statement seems plausible 
and therefore is more likely to be judged as true.    
Another reason why the illusion of truth effect is mostly studied with ambiguous 
statements is that there is something distinct about false information compared to true 
information in that there is a sense of novelty. A recent study shows that false news (i.e., 
information that is not factual) circulates faster and tends to spread wider than factual 
news (e.g., Vosoughi, et al., 2018). The researchers examined approximately 126,000 
tweeted stories from 2006 to 2017. There was 85-95% agreement by six independent 
fact-checking organizations when classifying the information as either true or false. The 
authors investigated how differentially the information spread among Twitter users. They 
found that false information spread faster, more broadly, more elaborately, and farther 
than true information. This effect occurred across all categories, including politics, 
terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, and financial information. The 
researchers also found that false information was determined to be more novel than true 
information, which suggests that people1 tend to share novel information. Whatever is a 
slight variation of what I know to be plausible is attributed as novel and often, these 
slight variations tend to be false. 
 
1 According to Vosoughi and colleagues (2018), both true and false news were more likely spread by 
robots than people as opposed to what is popularly believed.   
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 In sum, though it has not been the focus of the research in the field, I proposed 
that content of the statements and having relevant content knowledge are crucial to 
making rapid truth judgments. I will study the repetition effect when the valence of the 
content is different (see Experiment 1). I also proposed that even though a statement is 
read easily when there is a piece of information that is a slight variation in what they 
already know to be plausible, participants will detect it and judge the statement to be false 
(see Experiment 2). 
Difficulties in Testing Fluency Accounts and Measuring Fluency 
This section challenges and discusses the limits to the method of studying how an 
increase in processing ease mediates the illusion of truth effect. My concern is that 
fluency cannot be easily measured and was usually not measured in illusion of truth 
studies. Instead, fluency was the manipulation (i.e., repetition or ease of reading).  I will 
suggest using speed of processing during the judgment as a possible way of measuring 
fluency in illusion of truth effect paradigms. 
One way to manipulate fluency is via the availability heuristic, which states that 
sometimes the frequency of available examples (e.g., Kahnemman & Tversky, 1974) or 
how easily an example comes to mind (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-
Schatka, & Simons, 1991) governs the judgment. For instance, Schwarz and colleagues 
(1991) devised a study where the main question was to identify a person’s judgment 
about a trait category based on the frequency of instances related to the category. The 
participants would recall instances that they have behaved assertively and later would rate 
how assertive they are. One group of participants were asked to list six instances when 
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they were assertive, and the other group of participants were asked to list twelve 
instances. When the participants were required to answer twelve, they struggled to recall 
instances after a certain number. While the participants that were required to answer six, 
they could recall instances easily compared to the group that were required to answer 
twelve instances. After recalling the instances, both groups rated how assertive they 
thought they were. The participants in the twelve instances group judged themselves to be 
less assertive than the participants in the six instances group because they had a difficult 
time coming up with instances of assertiveness to meet the requirement: twelve instances. 
When asked to come up with instances when they were not assertive, the participants in 
the twelve instances group thought they were more assertive than the participants in the 
six instances group. The basis for the participants’ judgment on their assertiveness did not 
depend on the actual number of instances recalled but whether they felt it was easier or 
harder to come up with the examples. So, it can be established that fluency is the 
subjective feeling of ease. 
But how would one measure fluency when judging a statement’s truth besides 
participant self-report? When looking into the illusion of truth effect, fluency is not a 
dependent variable but rather an independent variable (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
Traditionally, statement repetition was the main source of fluency manipulation (e.g., 
Difonzo, Beckstead, Stupak, & Walders, 2016; Garcia-Marquez, Silva, Rever, & 
Unkelbach, 2015; Hasher et al., 1977; Johar & Rogeveen, 2007; Koch & Zerback, 2013; 
Moons, Mackie, & Garcia-Marquez, 2009). However, research within the area found that 
the illusion of truth effect could be found when there is no exact repetition of the 
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statements. In those studies, fluency is manipulated so statements could be visually easy 
to read (Reber & Schwarz, 1999), linguistically proficient (Brennan & Williams, 1995), 
or rhyming (McGlone & Tofighbakhash, 2000). Fluency was not determined by the 
participants, but rather by the experimenters’ manipulation. 
Though fluency is assumed to be the main factor for illusion of truth effects, the 
literature is unclear about the relationship between the judgment latency and judgment 
veracity. The meta-analysis discusses stimulus presentation time, delay between first 
judgment and last judgment, and interval times between stimuli presentation, but nothing 
about the time to make the judgment itself (Dechêne et al., 2010). In their paper 
demonstrating retrieval fluency (i.e., how easily something is retrieved) as the basis for 
confidence in answers to knowledge-based questions, Kelley and Lindsay (1993) showed 
that there was a negative correlation between response latency (i.e., how long it took for 
the participants to answer) and confidence (i.e., how confident they are that the answer 
they gave is correct). The confidence ratings were low when the participants took longer 
to respond. They argue that “the ease and speed with which supporting evidence comes to 
mind may also contribute to confidence (pp. 19).” Seeing confidence is also a type of 
meta-cognitive judgment (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), Kelley and Lindsay claimed 
that the fluency (i.e., ease and speed) of evidence generation can be used as basis for 
making a confidence judgment, I don’t see why that cannot be incorporated for truth 
judgments.  
If fluent statements seem fluent because they are processed quickly, and if fluency 
is what makes for an illusory truth judgment, then logically disfluent statements should 
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be judged slowly – there shouldn’t be fast false judgments. However, Unkelbach and 
Rom (2017) found that participants can quickly discern that a presented statement differs 
in only a single meaningful way from an earlier-presented statement. Such statements 
should be processed quickly because they are highly familiar, and hence fluent, yet they 
are still judged as false very rapidly.  This begs the question as to whether fluency 
predicts that the whole statement should be processed quickly, or if each of the parts in a 
statement should be processed quickly. I intend to investigate that (see Experiment 2) by 
using speed as a dependent variable.  
Proposing a Plausibility Account 
The main goal of this dissertation is to propose mechanisms other than fluency 
that could explain illusion of truth effects—perhaps not to replace them altogether, but to 
complement them. Specifically, the plausibility account proposed that when confronted 
with a statement whose veracity needs to be examined, we rapidly compare the statement 
to readily available information in memory.  To the degree that the most readily available 
information is consistent, we tend to think it is true.  To the degree that the most available 
information is inconsistent, we become skeptical.  The plausibility account suggests that 
repeated statements are judged as more truthful because repetition of the statements 
increases the availability of relevant information (i.e., the same statement), and hence the 
sense of plausibility. The reason why repeated statements and conceptually relevant 
information feels fluent may be that the information is plausible and therefore believable, 
and that should only increase with more repetition of strongly relevance information. 
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Thus, fluency could even be the result of plausibility, albeit in the special case where 
other relevant information is mostly unavailable.  
The remainder of the document proposed experiments that will get at the 
plausibility of a plausibility account. Overall, I concur with the existing literature in that 
the illusory truth judgments are made when there is a lack of veracity information (e.g., 
Brown & Nix, 1996) and the judgments are made because the statements are familiar 
(e.g., Bacon, 1979). I can see how repeated statements are perceived to be fluent and that 
it may lead to an illusory truth judgment (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Fluency 
accounts can explain how perceptually easy to read stimuli are more likely to be judged 
as true, however that effect size is on average small (d = .1) compared to the overall 
illusion of truth effect size (d = .3) (Dechêne et al., 2010). This suggests that there is 
residual variance that needs to be explained.  
Thus, I proposed content and speed can be important factors that together can help 
elucidate the remaining effect. Recently, Unkelbach and Rom (2017) found that new 
statements were 640 ms faster compared old statements. As mentioned in their paper, 
though slow judgments do not necessarily mean it is disfluent, statistically, fluent 
statements tend to be judged faster (e.g., Whittlesea, 1992). Unkelbach and Rom also 
found that statements that were judged true were more likely to be judged in a faster 
manner than statements that were judged as false which is consistent with what fluency 
account would predict.  The critical piece to their paper was their manipulation of old-
contradicting statements. For example, when participants studied statements such as “The 
world’s most poisonous snake is the Australian Coastal Taipan,” but was shown 
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Australian Inland Taipan, participants responded relatively faster than the new 
statements but was able to correctly identify as false when asked to judge true or false. 
This would suggest that participants easily processed the statements due to repetition but 
was able to correctly and quickly find an error.  
Not only is studying the content of the statement crucial, what you do with the 
content influences truth judgments. In their fourth experiment, Unkelbach and Rom 
(2017) showed statements such as “Most accidents occur close to weekends” as the target 
statement that required truth judgments but had different study conditions for half of the 
participants. Half of them saw a statement that implied the target statement such as “Most 
accidents occur on Mondays.” The results showed that disregarding the validity of the 
studied statement, it resulted in inflated truth judgments because it was implied.  
Not unlike the implied statements affecting truth judgments, I proposed that 
participants can use their knowledge base and what is learned from the content of the 
statement to connect the dots to make a plausible inference. The plausibility account of 
the illusion of truth effect was inspired by research on “sentence verification” by Reder 
(1982). Sentence verification occurs when one has read relevant information and must 
now indicate whether a given statement is consistent or inconsistent with what was read.  
This is strikingly close to making a truth judgment, except that relevant information was 
provided by experimenters in the case of sentence verification, but the only relevant 
information was the statement itself in the case of the illusion of truth studies.   
In contrast to sentence verification, sentence recognition is a probe match that 
requires specific retrieval of the target. Reder (1982) argued that sentences can be 
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verified by one of two ways: direct retrieval (e.g., direct match with the same target in 
memory) or by computing plausibility. She hypothesized that fact retrieval is less 
efficient sometimes than comparing plausibility (or inferring) especially at a delay. 
Plausibility is more effective in that direct retrieval needs a specific match (e.g., facts 
about Hope diamond) that might be inaccessible at a given moment. Plausibility 
judgments can be made using whatever is easily accessed at a given moment. She 
hypothesized and found (Experiment 2: Reder, 1982) that direct retrieval is not always 
the preferred/default strategy, nor is it effectively preferred over plausibility judgments. 
Her logic was that plausibility judgments will be preferred when there is no verbatim 
match found between the sentence probe and what is stored in memory. 
In her studies, Reder (1982) used two types of judgments: plausibility and direct 
retrieval. She used a sentence recognition task, which asked participants to make 
judgments of whether they recognize the sentence or not (i.e., direct retrieval). She also 
used a sentence verification task, which asked participants to make judgments of whether 
the sentence is sensible given the background story they have studied with the (inferred) 
sentence (i.e., plausibility). Participants made judgments of whether they recognized 
sentences or thought the sentences were plausible after having read stories of moderate 
interest. The sentences were either what was already stated in the story or sentences that 
were not. The statements differed in the degree of plausibility: highly plausible, 
moderately plausible, and implausible. She commented that components of the sentences 
were pulled from the story that participants originally studied but was all together 
implausible. This was carefully designed to avoid participants making plausibility 
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judgments out of lexical unfamiliarity. The judgement types (i.e., recognition or 
plausibility) and when the judgment occurred differed among participants. A group of 
participants made the judgments (either recognition or plausibility) immediately after the 
study session, another group of the participants made the judgments (either recognition or 
plausibility) 20 minutes after the study session, and the other group of participants made 
the judgments after a two-day delay.  
Though there are more results2 than that which contribute to understanding 
plausibility, the results that are most relevant to the plausibility account of illusion of 
truth are the reaction time results. After a delay, participants’ speed for making 
plausibility judgments were much faster compared to participants’ speed for making 
recognition judgments. Reder (1982) argued that participants were initially faster and 
more accurate in the immediate condition because intact verbatim traces of the story were 
available. However, after a delay, this trace weakened and therefore it took longer to 
make accurate judgments. Plausibility judgments do not require such a verbatim match as 
long as some trace of the story was represented and accessed.  
One can see the parallel between the sentence verification task and illusion of 
truth tasks with Reder’s paradigm. Participants were asked to make judgments based on 
memory and the inferences made from what is remembered (Reder, 1982). When the 
memory trace is weakened, participants and are constricted in response time, they were 
 
2 With more time delay, participants’ difference between recognition and plausibility increased. In that, 
participants in the recognition judgment group were less accurate after a delay than participants in the 
plausibility judgment group. Not only did patterns of accuracy responses change after a delay but so did 
reaction measures for both group of participants. 
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more likely to make a plausibility judgment faster and more accurate compared to when 
having to retrieve. Illusion of truth studies demonstrate a similar process whereby 
participants will make the truth judgment based on what is plausible when the trace 
memory is weakened — and they can do it quickly.    
Reder’s (1982) claim that a plausibility mechanism could explain how people 
rapidly made judgments in sentence verification could be extended to illusion of truth 
experiments.  Therefore, when there are more pieces to be used as cue to pool from 
already stored knowledge, the more likely the statement will be judged as true. As long as 
there is a single proposition that is implausible, participants will be able to make a “false” 
judgment based on it. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
While my future research will develop more specific mechanisms underlying 
plausibility, for the dissertation project, I compared the relative success of fluency and 
plausibility mechanisms more generally under circumstances likely to elicit plausibility 
effects. I specifically examined whether or not the speed to make the judgments and 
availability of relevant content knowledge about the statements influenced the final truth 
judgments. The series of experiments were designed to determine whether a plausibility 
mechanism is needed at all, or whether fluency3 alone can handle all of the results. 
There were two main experiments to test the hypotheses and one pilot experiment 
that was used to norm the material statements. The two main experiments consisted of a 
study (exposure) phase and a rating phase. During the study (exposure) phase, 
participants read the statements at their own pace. During the rating phase, participants 
either read a new statement or a version of the old statement or made truth judgments 
along with confidence judgments. The dependent variables for the two main experiments 
were the proportion of truth judgments (true or false), the confidence ratings about their 
previous truth judgment (1 – 5), and the reaction time during the rating (See Table 1 for 
detailed scale information). Though early studies used a long interval between the study 
and rating phases (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Hasher et al., 1977), recent studies found that the 
 
3 I both manipulated and measured fluency in all experiments. 
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interval themselves do not mediate the illusion of truth effect (e.g., Nadarevic & 
Erdfelder, 2014) and that effect could be found without a delay (e.g., Ozubko & 
Fugelsang, 2011). Therefore, for the experiments, there was no delay between the study 
phase and the rating phase.  
Experiment 1 focused on the supporting value of pre-exposed information about a 
statement by providing two associated sentences that contained either supporting 
(positive), contradicting (negative), or non-informative (neutral) statements related to the 
target statement. After studying these pre-exposed informative sentences, participants 
made judgments about the truth of the target statements. The fluency account implies that 
the valence of the sentences does not matter as long as they are repeated; any presented 
information that speeds future processing should lead to fast judgments, and hence seem 
true.  In contrast, the plausibility account directly predicts that the content valence of 
readily-available earlier claims would be an important factor in truth judgments, such that 
positive and possibly neutral information would increase illusion of truth, while negative 
information should decrease it.  
Experiment 2 measured plausibility of the parts of sentences directly.  Participants 
studied a list of statements during the initial study phase.  During the subsequent rating 
phase, participants rated the validity of a version of the statement that differed in clarity 
(e.g., awkward or identical to target) and the plausibility of the propositions assigned to 
that target statement. The fluency account directly predicts that the driving force behind 
inflated truth judgments should be factors that affect speed of processing, such as the 
clarity of the statements, length of the statements, and frequency of repetition of the 
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statements. In contrast, the plausibility account directly predicts that the lowest 
plausibility rating of the component propositions should be most important factor. 
Obviously, these accounts are not mutually exclusive, and so therefore they could both 
turn out to be true under different circumstances. 
Pilot Study 
The purpose of the pilot study was to norm the statements for future experiments. 
As previous research shows, statement ambiguity is a crucial factor in producing the 
illusion of truth phenomenon (e.g., Dechêne et al., 2010). When a statement is obviously 
true or false, there is usually little to no illusion of truth effect found. Therefore, it is 
important to use statements that are of an ambiguous nature (i.e., participants cannot 
easily tell if they are true or false).   
Method 
Participants.  I planned to run 18-20 participants per group based on previous 
norming studies. Fifty-seven students from UNCG participant pool were recruited. Three 
participants who did not complete the task were excluded from the data. There were 18 
participants in each group.   
Materials and Design.  The materials consisted of 96 trivia statements including 
two versions of incorrect statements making a total of 282 statements. The statements 
were collected from areas such as history, art, science, literature, film, music, social 
issues, and math from a distractor task used in a separate project with a collaborator, 
Peter Verkoeijen and his lab. An example of the trivia statements is, “Mel Blanc voiced 
the cartoon character Bugs Bunny.” The two versions of incorrect statements are the 
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same sentence with one element switched to an alternative. For instance, in the example 
of above, the incorrect statements mentioned Don Messick or Joseph Barbera instead of 
Mel Blanc. The statements are provided in Appendix B.  
I constructed three counterbalanced versions of the 96-item statement lists, each 
containing 32 true statements and 64 false statements. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three lists.  The order in which the statements were presented was 
randomized for each participant.  Thus, everyone rated each statement once in either its 
true or one of its false versions.  
Procedure. Participants were told that they would see a series of trivia 
statements. They were informed that some of the statements are true and some of them 
are false, without the exact ratio information being given. Each statement was presented 
with a True or False question and participants answered by clicking on the answer that 
best described their judgment. Afterwards, they rated how confident they were about the 
previous rating and the plausibility of the statements. See Table 1 for examples. The 
response rates for each truth judgment, confidence judgment, and plausibility judgment 
were recorded and were self-paced. 
Results 
The goal of the pilot was to norm the statements for future experiments. See 
Appendix B for the results and statements. I collected the accuracy rate of each statement 
(e.g., true items rated as true vs. true items rated as false). I collected the confidence 
judgment ratings, the plausibility ratings for all statements including the 96 true 
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statements and its two false counterparts, and the reaction time was recorded and 
analyzed.  
The mean accuracy rating was M = 0.50 (SD = 0.05), the mean confidence rating 
was M = 1.85 (SD = 0.02), and the mean plausibility rating was M = 2.79 (SD = 0.07). 
The mean reaction time from start to first response (i.e., truth ratings) was M = 6.53 (SD 
= 0.04).  
Experiment 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine whether people rapidly use relevant 
information that was previously studied to produce their subsequent truth judgments 
about a statement. I therefore manipulated whether or not relevant content was presented 
before making a truth judgment about a target statement.  The pre-exposed sentences 
were either an exact repetition (i.e., an illusion of truth replication) of the target statement 
(e.g., Mel Blanc voiced the cartoon character Bugs Bunny); relevant and consistent with 
the statement (e.g., Mel Blanc voiced Roger Rabbit before his death in 1989), relevant 
and inconsistent with the statement (e.g., Bugs Bunny was voiced by Greg Burson during 
the 1990s), or seemingly relevant but non-informative (e.g., Bugs Bunny is a character in 
Looney Toons first created in the 1930s) about the veracity of the statement to be judged.   
This manipulation was designed to help differentiate the effects of fluency and 
plausibility. The fluency account predicts that pre-exposed relevant information should 
speed fluent processing of the statements by making the words in them more highly 
primed, regardless of the actual relevance of the pre-exposed statement.  Consistent with 
this prediction, earlier studies have shown that pre-exposed statements that overlap in 
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content (e.g., Arkes et al., 1991) or even briefly-shown primes intended to speed reading 
of statements (Brown & Marsh, 2009; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993) increase the probability 
of rating statements as true compared to new statements.   
In contrast, the plausibility account predicts that people should be sensitive to the 
content of the pre-exposed information.  Therefore, they should be more likely to accept 
as true a statement that has relevant and consistent information about it in memory than a 
statement that has relevant but inconsistent information about it in memory.  
Furthermore, this process must occur quickly if it is to be a candidate account of the 
illusion of truth effect. 
Method  
Participants. In accordance with the power analysis, 84 participants’ data were 
used for analysis. There were 110 participants from UNCG subject pool in total but the 
data for the participants that were noncompliant as reflected in reaction time data were 
excluded. The goal number of participants was based on an a priori power analysis on 
G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The analysis was conducted 
for an ANOVA: repeated measures, within-between interactions. The repeated measures 
correlation was set at r = .02 based on a previous study that was done in the lab on 
Illusion of truth. The effect size was set at f = .25 a medium effect based on the literature 
(e.g., Dechéne et al., 2010) and the power was set at β = .85.  The within-subjects factor 
was the number of repetitions (3: 0, 1, & 2) and the between factor was the pre-exposed 
sentence category (4: relevant, neutral, negative, & exact). This is the lowest powered 
analysis that tests my most important hypothesis.  
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Design. The design was a 4 (pre-exposed sentence category: contradicting, 
neutral, confirming, exact) x 3 (number of repetitions: 0, 1, 2) mixed design. The 
category of pre-exposed sentences was the between-subjects factor and the number of 
repetitions was the within-subjects factor. The category of the pre-exposed content 
provided during the study phase differed among the four groups. Participants in the exact 
group saw the exact target statements. This group was a control group to replicate the 
illusion of truth effect. Participants in the negative group saw the negatively associated 
sentences of the target statements. Participants in the positive group saw the positively 
associated sentences of the target statements. Finally, participants in the neutral group 
saw the neutrally associated sentences of the target statements. The dependent variables 
were reaction time (veracity rating and confidence rating) and the mean truth-confidence 
judgment (ranging from -5 [very confident not true] to +5 [very confident true]). 
Materials.  Normed stimuli statements from the pilot study were used in this 
study (see Appendix B for stimulus set). Sixty statements that are near the middle 
plausibility point (M = 2.61, SD = 0.49) and those that participants had difficulty judging 
as true or false (54% accuracy, mode confidence = 1) were selected as target statements 
for judgments. Half of the statements were true, and the other half were false. The 
participants were told that there were both true and false statements but did not know the 
exact ratio.  
Each 60 target statements each had two associated pre-exposed sentences that 
varied in their content valence. Native English-speaking research assistants4 were asked 
 
4 Many thanks to Myranda Cook, Danielle Chapman, and Carson Peske for their help. 
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to make sentences that confirmed the target sentence (i.e., confirming), contradict it (i.e., 
contradicting), and were related but neither confirm nor contradict the target statement 
(i.e., neutral). We tried to make sentences based on true facts, but there were a few that 
needed to be made up. 
For example, if the target sentence were, “The Hope diamond is cursed,” then an 
example pre-exposed content sentence in the confirming category would be, “Their 
owners have died upon the possession of the Hope diamond.” For the neutral category, an 
example would be, “The Hope diamond is blue,” and for the contradicting category, an 
example would be, “Diamonds are lucky in Tanzania.” Examples of pre-exposed content 
sentences are in Appendix C.  
Procedure. During the exposure phase, the pre-exposure statements from the 
correct category was presented. Presentation was self-paced so the participants could 
advance to the next screen. Repetition of the pre-exposed sentence was manipulated in a 
within-subjects design varying from 0 to 2 repetitions. That is, one-third of the associated 
pre-exposure sentences of the target statements were shown during the exposure phase 
(0-repetition condition); the target statements in the 0-repetition condition were only 
rated during the rating phase. Another one-third were shown once during the study phase 
(1-repetition), and the rest were shown twice during the exposure phase (2-repetition).  
During the rating phase, each of the target statements appeared with a question 
asking whether the statement was true or false. Then, participants rated how confident 
they were in the judgment. The scales were identical to those in the Pilot study (see Table 
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1), and the full procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. The ratings were self-paced, but the 
veracity judgment and confidence judgment reaction times were recorded. 
Results and Discussion  
My main goal was to investigate whether plausibility mechanisms can play a role 
in illusion of truth judgments. Plausibility predicts that the content valence of the pre-
exposed sentences would affect the ratings, but fluency alone would not predict such a 
difference, as the lexical familiarity should increase fluency and therefore induce the 
effect. 
Veracity-Confidence Rating5. I conducted a 3 (repetition: 0,1,2) x 4 (content 
valence: exact, confirming, neutral, contradicting) mixed ANOVA (see Figure 2 for 
means). The veracity-confidence ratings were calculated by multiplying the confidence 
ratings by their veracity ratings with the truth as a positive score and false as a negative 
score. The ratings therefore ranged from -5 [very confident not true] to +5 [very 
confident true].  
As be predicted by both plausibility and fluency, there was a main effect of 
repetition, F(2, 160) =15.547, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.163, MSE = 9.783. Once repeated (M 
=1.005, SD = 1.160) statements had significantly higher veracity confidence judgments 
than new statements (M = 0.380, SD = 0.805), t(83) = 3.854, p < .001, as did twice 
repeated (M = 0.930, SD = 1.326), t(83) = 3.027, p = .003. However, there was no 
 
5 I conducted the standard illusion of truth effect paradigm with the veracity judgments only and the 
results were similar to that of the veracity-confidence ratings. 
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significant difference between the twice repeated and once repeated statements’ veracity 
confidence judgment, t(83) = 0.939, p = .350.  
As plausibility predicted, there was a main effect of content valence, F(3, 80) = 
18.743, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.413, MSE = 1.167. The exact sentences (M = 1.467, SD = 0.784) 
had significantly higher confidence veracity ratings than confirming sentences (M = 
0.794, SD = 0.544), t(40) = 3.374, p = .002, neutral sentences (M = 0.742, SD = 0.408), 
t(40) = 3.913, p < .001, and contradicting sentences (M = 0.055, SD = 0.692), t(40) = 
6.322, p < .001. Confirming sentences had significantly higher confidence veracity 
ratings than contradicting sentences, t(40) = 3.852, p < .001, but not for neutral sentences 
t(40) = 0.353, p =.726. Lastly, neutral sentences had higher confidence veracity ratings 
than contradicting sentences, t(40) = 3.921, p < .001. In sum, disregarding any repetition 
effects, exact repetitions induced higher veracity-confidence judgment ratings than any 
other sentences, and confirming sentences produced higher veracity-confidence ratings 
than contradicting sentences.  
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of repetition and 
content valence, F(6,160) = 13.766, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = 0.340, MSE = 0.629. To follow up 
the interaction, the number of repetitions was separated by content valence of the pre-
exposed sentences. See Table 2 for the follow up t-test results. For exact sentences, there 
was a significant difference between no repetition and one repetition and two repetitions. 
This can be considered a replication of the Illusion of Truth effect, as repetition induced 
an inflated truth judgment. There were no differences between one and two repetitions.  
For confirming sentences, there was a significant difference between no repetition and 
 
31 
 
  
one repetition and two repetitions, replicating the illusion of truth effect for related 
sentences. There were no differences between one and two repetitions. There were no 
repetition effects for neutral sentences, indicating merely related but non-informative 
material did not induce an illusion of truth effect. Finally, for contradicting sentences, 
only when the sentences were repeated twice were there a significant negative repetition 
effect compared to no repetition.  
Averaging across all content valences, there was a repetition effect in that some 
repetition is better than no repetition, which both fluency and plausibility would tend to 
predict. However, when comparing the twice repeated and no repeated statements’ 
veracity confidence judgments for the contradicting sentences, we see the mean ratings 
decreased. This is the opposite of an illusion of truth effect, in that the more contradicting 
statements are presented, the more likely the participants thought it to be false. As only 
plausibility would predict, content valence influenced the ratings.  
Reaction Time.  Reaction time was divided into two categories: the time it took 
the participants to make the veracity judgment (i.e., VJRT) and the time it took the 
participants to make the confidence judgments (i.e., CJRT). Previous literature has 
focused on the veracity judgment while asking the confidence simultaneously. However, 
the present studies look at the two times separately as the values indicate different 
concepts. The time it takes to make the veracity judgment should reflect the time it takes 
the participant to decide whether it is truthful or not (i.e., + or – on the current 
measurement scale). The time it takes to make the confidence judgments should reflect 
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the degree to which they are confident about the previously made veracity judgment (i.e., 
1 being very not confident and 5 being very confident on the current measurement scale). 
The reaction time data for both veracity judgment and confidence judgments, were 
approximately normally distributed (see Figures 3 and 4). Therefore, the raw reaction 
time data were used for the analyses. 
The fluency account implies that repetition decreases the time it takes to make the 
veracity judgment. The content valence would not make any difference as long as there 
were some content that was related to the target statement. In contrast, the plausibility 
account suggests that the more relevant the information is to the target statement, the 
more confident the judgments are which would manifest by speedy confidence judgment 
time (for review see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).  
Veracity Judgment Reaction Time (VJRT). Fluency predicts that repetition would 
induce a faster VJRT. However, a 3 (repetition) x 4 (content valence) ANOVA on VJRT 
(see Figure 5) revealed no significant effects of VJRT for repetition, 𝐹𝐹(2,160) = 1.201, 𝑝𝑝 
=.304,  𝜂𝜂2 =  .015, MSE = .047, condition, 𝐹𝐹(3,80) = 1.496, 𝑝𝑝 =.222, ηp2 = .053, MSE 
= .671, or their interaction, 𝐹𝐹(6,120) = 0.991, 𝑝𝑝 = .434, ηp2 =.036, MSE = .947. Notably, 
judgments are made very fast (less than 2s), consistent with the plausibility account 
assuming a fast judgment.  
Confidence Judgment Reaction Time (CJRT). Plausibility predicts that there is a 
difference. A 3 (repetition) x 4 (content valence) ANOVA on CJRT (see Figure 6 for 
means and Table 2 for t-test results) revealed a main effect of repetition, F(2, 160) = 
7.563, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.086, MSE = 182.942, where the once repeated sentences (M = 
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6.067 s, SD = 2.217 s) were slower than new sentences (M = 6.407 s, SD = 2.091 s). 
Twice repeated sentences (M = 5.798 s, SD = 1.921 s) also induced a decrease in 
judgment time compared to new sentences. There was no difference between once and 
twice repeated sentences, but the difference was in the right direction for the two 
repetitions being faster, t(83) = 1.954, p = .054. There was no main effect of condition, 
F(3, 80) = 0.539, p = .657, ηp2 = 0.020, MSE = 2370.372, or interaction between 
repetition and condition, F(6, 160) = 1.059, p =.390, ηp2 = 0.038, MSE = 182.932.  
Conclusion.  The Experiment 1 veracity-confidence judgment results showed that 
there was an effect of repetition and content valence on veracity confidence judgments. 
Repetition induced an increase in the veracity-confidence judgments for all content 
valences except for the contradicting condition, which is what was predicted by the 
plausibility account. As both the plausibility and fluency accounts would predict, 
repetition of the exact statements did increase the veracity-confidence judgments which 
was a replication of the immediate Illusion of Truth effect studies (e.g., Brown & Nix, 
2006). What is different about this experiment compared to that of the previous literature 
is that the veracity judgments and confidence judgments were separated into two 
judgment making trials instead of combining them onto one scale. This allowed me to 
distinguish whether repetition affected reaction time to the veracity judgment or the 
confidence judgment. The reaction time data suggested that repetition influenced the 
confidence ratings but not the veracity judgments. Specifically, repetition seemed to 
decrease the time it took to make the confidence judgments about their veracity judgment 
 
34 
 
  
(and the veracity judgment people gave), but the time it took to make the veracity 
judgment was unaffected.  
With Experiment 1, I have shown that plausibility might play a role in how the 
illusion of effect occurs. But to what degree? With Experiment 2, I proposed to 
understand how much plausibility would be able to account for the effect in comparison 
to the fluency account. 
Experiment 2 
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to compare directly whether plausibility 
of parts of the statement predicts illusion of truth for the statement. The plausibility 
account suggests that people rapidly assess the plausibility of parts of a statement, so the 
more parts there are, the greater the likelihood that one of them seems implausible.  
Furthermore, it suggests that the most implausible part of the statement is the part that 
should drive the truth judgments.  For example, if a person read a statement like, “The 
phrase Bob’s your uncle originated in Ireland in 1900 when Barack Obama became prime 
minister through nepotism,” everything likely seems plausible except that Barack Obama 
was in Ireland in 1900.  Therefore, the whole statement seems false. For the sake of 
argument, the piece about US former president becoming the prime minister of Ireland 
was added to show plausibility’s role in the judgment. In the typical illusion of truth 
paradigm, the overall plausibility of the pieces is ambiguous. For ambiguous statements, 
the fluency hypothesis suggests that the length of the sentence and the speed of reading it 
matters, not the number of facts therein per se (although these should be correlated). 
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I therefore manipulated both fluency and plausibility by varying the number of 
propositions in a sentence and whether it was phrased in a more awkward way or an 
easier-to-read way. Propositions can be defined as the smallest unit of knowledge for 
which its veracity can be judged as either true or false (Anderson, 1974; Kintsch & van 
Dijk, 1978). The more propositions are in a statement, the longer it will be, making the 
statement harder to process. The fluency account predicts that both manipulations (i.e., 
number of propositions and phrasing clarity) should decrease fluency and therefore 
decrease the likelihood of judging the statement as true. The plausibility account would 
also be consistent with effects of repetition and clarity, as the match between the target at 
rating and study will be a deciding factor for judgment. The plausibility account predicts 
an effect of the number of propositions because statements that have more propositions 
would tend to have a higher probability of having an implausible proposition.  
After making their truth and confidence judgments, people rated the plausibility 
of each of the propositions in the sentence.  The plausibility account predicts that any 
implausible part of the sentence should make the whole implausible.  Furthermore, the 
presence of an implausible part should be a better predictor than the number of 
propositions. By this logic, the minimum plausibility rating would be a better predictor of 
final veracity-confidence judgments than the time it took to make the veracity judgments 
as the fluency account would predict. More propositions only increase doubt because one 
or more of them may be implausible, not due to length per se.  For example, “Donald 
Trump is a rich billionaire who was on television and became president of the United 
States in 2016, and owns golf courses and hotels,” is long and full of propositions, but all 
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of them are true/plausible, so the sentence should still be judged as true. In sum, fluency 
would predict the statement clarity, number of propositions, and repetition, and the time it 
took to make the veracity judgment would be a better predictor for final veracity-
confidence judgments. However, plausibility would predict the minimum plausibility 
rating value and the time it took to make the plausibility rating would be the strongest 
predictors.  
Method 
Participants. Seventy-six participants’ data were used for analysis in accordance 
with the number of participants required by the power analyses. Two power analyses 
were conducted. A total of 47 participants were set as goal for participant number based 
on an a priori power analysis on G*Power 3.1.9.2 ((Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) for a step-wise multiple regression with two predictors (plausibility and reaction 
time). A total of 76 participants were needed for an ANOVA: repeated measures, within-
between interactions. The repeated measures correlation was set at r = .02 based on a 
previous study that was done in the lab on Illusion of truth.  For both analyses, the effect 
size was set at f = .25 a medium effect based on the literature (e.g., Dechéne et al., 2010) 
and the power was set at β = .85. A total of 86 participants’ data were collected, but 10 
participants’ data was excluded due to too fast or missing reaction time data.  
Materials.  The material used for study and truth judgment rating were statements 
that were normed in the Pilot study. See Appendix D for statement examples. The 
statements with low confidence ratings (M = 1.14, SD = 0.45) and accuracy rating that 
reflected ambiguity (M = 0.50, SD = 0.16) were collected. The goal was to select 
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statements that had large range of plausibility, but the majority of the statements were 
rated with 2’s and 3’s out of the 1 to 4 range (M = 2.68, SD = .55). There were a total of 
36 statements, of which half were true and half were false. Of the 36 statements, 24 were 
used during the study phase and the remaining 12 statements were presented as foils 
during the rating phase.  
One native English-speaking research assistant6 generated the awkward 
counterpart statements for each original statement. The instructions for the research 
assistants were to make the sentence lengthy, use passive voice, and use as many words 
as possible to make the sentence seem harder to read.  For example, the sentence, “Mel 
Blanc voiced the cartoon character Bugs Bunny” was rewritten as, “Bugs Bunny who is a 
cartoon character used to be voiced by a man named Mel Blanc.” The word count was 
higher for the awkward statements (M = 13.32, SD = 4.87) compared to the clear target 
statements (M = 10.21, SD = 2.70). I evaluated appropriateness of the statements 
generated by the research assistants.  
Another native English-speaking research assistant7 segmented the statements 
into propositions by identifying content chunks (i.e., propositions). The instructions for 
the research assistants were to segment the sentence with one unit of thought per 
segmented sentence. For example, the sentence “Mel Blanc voiced the cartoon character 
Bugs Bunny” was segmented to: (1) Mel Blanc is a voice actor, (2) Bugs Bunny is a 
cartoon character, (3) Mel Blanc voiced Bugs Bunny. The number of propositions ranged 
 
6 Many thanks to Paolo Forcadela.  
7 Many thanks to Katlynn Mabine. 
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from two to five. However, only statement with two and three propositions were analyzed 
as those were the statements that all participants saw during the experiment. I evaluated 
appropriateness of the statements generated by the research assistants. 
Design.  The main independent variables were the number of propositions within 
a given sentence and the clarity of the statements’ phrasing. It was a repeated measures 
design where the clarity of the statements (direct vs. awkward), repetition (0 vs. 1) and 
the number of propositions (2 vs. 3) were all within-subjects factors. The main dependent 
variable was, as in Experiment 1, a combination of the truth and confidence judgment (-5 
to +5). I also measured how long it took for the participants to make the judgments. 
Finally, the rated plausibility of each of the propositions that make up the target and foil 
sentences was also a dependent variable. 
Procedure.  There were two phases in this experiment: the study phase and the 
rating phase. See Figure 7 for an illustration of the procedure. During the study phase, 
participants studied the 24 statements in a self-paced manner. Participants did not receive 
any information about whether a statement was true or false, although they were 
instructed that “some of them are true and some of them are false.”  
During the rating phase, participants rated the 24 target statements and the 12 foil 
statements in a random order. Half of the statements that were provided were 
purposefully awkwardly phrased to reduce fluency. The other half of the statements were 
clearer in phrasing. They were instructed to rate each statement at their own pace for 
truthfulness (true or false) and then how confident they were about their judgment (1-5). 
After the confidence rating, they saw the propositions for the statement. Each proposition 
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that composed the target statement was presented on a separate screen. They rated how 
plausible each proposition was on a scale of 1-4, as in Pilot study (See Table 1 for 
examples of the rating anchors).  All judgment tasks were self-paced, and the response 
times while making truth, confidence, and plausibility judgments were recorded.  
Results and Discussion 
The main question was whether fluency or plausibility (or both) are likely to 
underlie the illusion of truth effect. I addressed this question by analyzing the plausibility 
ratings of the propositions and the time it took to make the judgments. I conducted two 
main sets of analyses: ANOVAs and a series of correlation and regression analyses. 
ANOVAs. I conducted 2 (repetition) x 2 (clarity) x 2 (number of propositions) 
mixed ANOVAs on three main Dependent Variables: truth-confidence judgments (which 
range from -5 to +5) and on both reaction times (how long it took to make the truth 
judgment, and confidence judgment).  
Veracity-Confidence Judgments. We expected veracity-confidence ratings to be 
influenced by clarity, repetition, and number of propositions. See Figure 8 for mean 
veracity-confidence ratings as a function of these variables. There was a main effect of 
repetition, F(1,76) = 21.278, p <.001, ηp2 = 0.218, MSE = 5.159, where the repeated 
statements (M = 1.277, SD = 1.325) had higher ratings compared to new statements (M = 
0.433, SD = 1.207). This is a replication of the Illusion of Truth Effect. As expected, 
there was also a main effect of clarity, F(1,76) = 13.330, p <.001, ηp2 = 0.149, MSE = 
1.714, such that the clear statements (M = 4.191, SD = 3.982) had higher ratings 
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compared to awkward statements (M = 2.650, SD = 3.901). Number of propositions, 
however, did not reach significance, F(1,76) = 3.501, p =.065, ηp2 = 0.044, MSE = 2.034.  
The main effects were qualified by several interaction effects. There were 
significant two-way interactions between repetition and clarity, F(1,76) = 25.162, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0. 249, MSE = 1.652, repetition and proposition number, F(1,76) = 5.695, p 
=.019, ηp2 = 0. 070, MSE = 2.297, and clarity and proposition number, F(1,76) = 25.051, 
p <.001, ηp2 = 0.248, MSE = 1.632. However, because there was also a significant three-
way interaction, F(1,76) = 12.330, p =.001, ηp2 = 0.140, MSE = 2.201, in lieu of 
following up on all statistically significant two-way interactions I followed up the three-
way. See Table 3 for detailed follow up t-test results and Figure 8 for the means. 
Statements that had three propositions showed repetition effects in that both clear and 
awkward statements were showing an inflated veracity-confidence judgment as would be 
seen in illusion of truth. For statements that had two propositions, only the awkward 
statements showed a repetition effect where the new had lower veracity confidence 
ratings compared to repeated statements. When there was less plausibility information to 
base the judgment on (because there were fewer propositions), fluency related 
information became a more reliable basis for judgment.  
Reaction Time. The reaction time data were separated into two categories, as in 
Experiment 1: Veracity Rating Time (VRT) and Confidence Rating Time (CRT). Both 
reaction time data were positively skewed (see Figures 9 and 10) so I log-transformed the 
data for further analyses.  
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The fluency account predicts that veracity judgments should be sensitive to 
repetition, as processing is more fluent with more repetitions.  For veracity judgment 
reaction time (see Figure 11 and Table 3), there was indeed a main effect of repetition, 
F(1,76) = 48.997, p < .001, ηp2 =.392, MSE = 0.018, where the once repeated statements 
(M = 5.798 s, SD = 1.457 s) were significantly more quickly rated than new statements 
(M = 6.896 s, SD = 1.529 s). There was also a main effect of clarity, F(1, 76) = 7.401, p 
= .008, ηp2  = 089, MSE = 0.017, where the clear statements (M = 6.113 s, SD = 1.517 s) 
were more quickly rated than awkward statements (M = 6.534 s, SD = 1.468 s), consistent 
with the fluency account. However, there was no main effect of proposition number, F(1, 
76) = 0.900, p = .346, ηp2  = .012, MSE = .013. Thus, unlike in Experiment 1, repetition 
and clarity both made veracity judgment times faster, which is what the fluency account 
predicts.  
These results were further qualified by a number of interaction effects. There was 
a two-way interaction between repetition and clarity F(1,76) = 5.621,  p = .020, ηp2  = 
0.069, MSE = 0.016, but not for repetition and number of propositions, F(1,76) = 0.101, p 
= .751, ηp2 = .001, MSE = .012, or proposition number and clarity, F(1,76) = 2.189, p 
= .143, ηp2  = .028, MSE = .014. Because the three-way interaction was also significant, 
F(1,76) = 7.110, p = .009, ηp2 = 0.086, MSE = 0.014, I reported follow-ups to the three-
way interaction in lieu of following up on all statistically significant two-way 
interactions. I computed t-tests comparing repeated to non-repeated for each level of 
awkwardness and proposition number in order to test for illusion of truth effects (see 
Table 3 for detailed follow up t-test results). For statements with three propositions, both 
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awkward and clear statements showed significant repetition effects in that the repeated 
statements had significantly higher veracity confidence judgments compared to the new 
statements. However, for statements that had two propositions, only the awkward 
statements showed a significant repetition effect. Repeated statements received high 
veracity-confidence ratings across all sentence types, regardless of length or 
awkwardness. A post-hoc one-way ANOVA8 on repeated items’ veracity confidence 
judgment and veracity judgment time separately showed that there is no effect of 
proposition or clarity. In contrast, new statements were sensitive to fluency, with both 
awkwardness and length having some impact on veracity-confidence judgments. 
For confidence reaction time (see Figure 12), there was no main effect of 
repetition, F(1, 76) = 0.719, p = .399, ηp2 = 0.009, MSE = 0.016, no main effect of 
proposition number, F(1, 76) = 3.288, p = .074, ηp2 = 0, MSE = 0.012 and no main effect 
clarity, F(1, 76) = 0.718, p = .399, ηp2 = 0.009, MSE = 0.014. There were no two-way or 
three-way interactions (all Fs < 1).  
Correlation and Regression Analyses. My next set of analyses all examined the 
predictive value of measures relating to fluency (mostly reaction time measures) and 
measures relating to plausibility (derived from the plausibility ratings of the propositions 
that made up the statements). 
 
8 Dependent Variable: veracity confidence judgments; Independent Variable: proposition F(1,1384) = 
0.018, p = .894; clarity F(1,1384) = 0.851, p = .356.  
Dependent Variable: veracity judgment reaction time; Independent Variable: proposition F(1,688) = 
3.614, p = .058; clarity F(1,688) = 0.064, p = .801.  
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Correlating Reaction Time and Plausibility Ratings with Veracity-Confidence 
Judgments. My next question was whether fluency (reaction time) or plausibility 
(assessed by the plausibility ratings) was a better predictor of veracity-confidence 
judgments for individual statements.  Therefore, I conducted a multiple regression 
analysis to evaluate whether reaction time or plausibility rating is a better predictor of 
veracity-confidence ratings. The correlation coefficients of the predictors (see Table 4) 
showed that all measures of plausibility ratings and reaction time measures while 
completing the plausibility rating were significantly correlated except for the veracity 
judgment reaction time (r = -.047, p > .05) and confidence judgment reaction time (r = 
-.034, p > .05).  
As suggested by a committee member, I conducted a regression model that 
predicted veracity-confidence judgment using the veracity judgment reaction time and 
minimum plausibility rating. These measures were identified as the most theoretically-
relevant to comparing fluency and plausibility. The fluency account would suggest that 
the time it took to make the veracity judgment is the best predictor whereas the 
plausibility account would suggest that the lowest plausibility rating of a proposition 
would be the best predictor. The results favored the plausibility account in that 17.2% of 
the variance was explained by the minimum plausibility rating, while confidence 
judgment reaction time explained no additional variance. This is unsurprising considering 
the non-significant correlations between veracity judgment reaction time and veracity-
confidence judgments.  
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Best-Predictor Regression Analyses.  To make a less conservative test of both 
accounts, I conducted two separate forward stepwise linear multiple regression models to 
find the best predictor from the reaction times (i.e., fluency) and the best predictor from 
the plausibility ratings. A third model compared the best reaction time variable and the 
best plausibility variable.  
 The first model was conducted to find the best reaction time9 predictor for truth 
judgments. See Table 5 for a summary of the regression coefficients. The dependent 
variable was the confidence-veracity judgment ratings and the predictors that were added 
in the model are as followed: Total RT (entire time it took to rate the plausibility ratings), 
Minimum RT (minimum time spent rating a particular proposition’s plausibility ratings), 
Maximum RT (minimum time spent rating a particular proposition’s plausibility ratings), 
Average RT (average time spent rating a particular proposition’s plausibility ratings), 
VRT (time spent making the truth judgment) and CRT (time spent making the confidence 
judgment about their previous truth judgment).  
The fluency account suggested that the best predictor will be reaction time during 
the veracity-confidence ratings (VRT), as that would form the basis for participants’ 
sense of fluency for the statement’s content (while piecing together the reaction time for 
proposition processing). However, for the plausibility account, the minimum reaction 
time while rating the plausibility for the propositions would be a better predictor. The 
results favored the plausibility account in that the best and only predictor was minimum 
 
9 All reaction time data was log-transformed for the analysis. Doing a quadratic analysis of the reaction 
time did not change the results of models 1 and 3. 
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reaction time for rating a particular proposition’s plausibility rating (β = -.086, p < .001), 
though it explained only 0.6% of the variance.  
The second model was conducted to find the best plausibility ratings predictor for 
truth judgments. See Table 6 for a summary of the regression coefficients. The dependent 
variable was the confidence-veracity judgment ratings and the predictors that were added 
in the model are as followed: Average Plausibility (average plausibility ratings for the 
propositions associated with the target statement), Minimum Plausibility (minimum 
plausibility rating for a particular proposition associated with the target statement), and 
Maximum Plausibility (maximum plausibility rating for a particular proposition 
associated with the target statement). The plausibility account would predict the best 
predictor to be the minimum plausibility value for the proposition rating. The fluency 
account wouldn’t predict that the rating value for propositions would matter as much but 
rather the length or number of propositions, which is why fluency would predict a 
reaction time measure would be a better predictor. The results showed that the minimum 
plausibility rating explained 7.6% of the variance, and was the best predictor for truth 
judgments, again favoring the plausibility account.  
The third model was conducted to understand the relationship between fluency 
and plausibility by entering the best predictors for reaction time (i.e., Minimum Reaction 
Time) and plausibility ratings (i.e., minimum plausibility rating) determined in the 
previous models. See Table 7 for a summary of the regression coefficients. I predicted 
that the total reaction time will be more predictive of the illusion of truth from the fluency 
perspective. But the minimum plausibility rating would be a better predictor than any of 
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the reaction time measures. The results were in favor of the plausibility account. Once 
minimum plausibility was accounted for, reaction time had no additional predictive 
power. 
Effects of Statement Clarity. As part of the post-hoc analyses, to better understand 
the data, I looked at the regression coefficients separately by statement clarity. For 
awkward statements, the stepwise regression analysis showed that minimum plausibility 
ratings explained 11.4% of the variance, R2 = .114, F(1, 1384) = 178.946, p < .001. For 
clear statements, the stepwise regression analysis showed that minimum plausibility 
rating explained 4.1% of the variance, R2 = .041, F(1, 1383) = 58.663, p < .001 and 
adding the minimum reaction time increased 0.6%, ΔR2 = .006, F(1, 1383) = 9.327, p 
= .002. When running a stepwise regression on Veracity-Confidence Judgments for just 
the statements that were judged true, the minimum plausibility explained 3.9% of the 
variance, R2 = .039, F(1, 1858) = 75.228, p < .001, while the reaction time was not 
significant.  
Conclusion 
In this experiment, I tested predictions from the plausibility and fluency account 
and found that plausibility of statements’ propositions were stronger predictors of the 
truth judgments than reaction time measures. This does not mean fluency did not matter. 
Rather, when strong plausibility exists, it may be more valued than fluency. The 
regression analyses on the variables suggest the time it takes to judge the lowest 
plausibility rating is the best predictor within the reaction time domain, but the actual 
value of the lowest plausibility rating is a better predictor. The ANOVA analysis seems 
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to confirm what was already known about the Illusion of Truth effect in that repetition 
does influence subsequent veracity-confidence judgments. The post-hoc analyses showed 
that repetition also increases mean plausibility ratings of the propositions. The regression 
analysis shed more light into the role of plausibility and rating time on veracity-
confidence judgments. And as the plausibility account would predict, plausibility ratings 
(either minimum or average) was a better predictor of veracity-confidence judgments 
compared to the time it took to rate veracity.  
The fluency account received support as well, with awkward statements rated less 
true than clear statements. The plausibility account does not predict much of a difference 
between the two phrasings, as plausibility would mainly be affected by the content. The 
3-way interaction can be interpreted as little effect of fluency factors (i.e., clarity, length, 
or repetition) with repetition, but a reliable effect without. It is hard to tell if more 
repetitions and delayed judgment would make fluency stronger.  
For reaction time, the fluency and plausibility accounts each predict a main effect 
of repetition, clarity, and number of propositions. The fluency account further predicts a 
main effect of clarity, because the awkward and wordy statement is processed less easily 
and therefore will likely take longer to process than clearer statements. By the same logic, 
fluency predicts a main effect of number of propositions. However, the reaction time data 
show a three-way interaction of repetition, clarity, and proposition number, a main effect 
of repetition only and a two-way interaction between clarity and repetition. The new 
statements took longer to make veracity judgments overall, specifically when the 
statements were awkwardly worded, which supports the fluency account. 
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CHAPTER III 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 The goal of the present experiments was to test predictions derived from the 
plausibility account of the illusion of truth effect. The fluency account proposes that 
repetition causes ease of processing, which then inflates veracity judgments. In contrast, 
the plausibility account suggests that highly available content is strengthened through 
repetition, and that people rapidly compare statements with what is readily available in 
memory, inflating veracity judgments with repetition. Experiment 1 showed that there is 
an interaction between content valence and repetition frequency, consistent with the 
plausibility account. Experiment 2 showed that plausibility ratings of propositions were a 
better predictor of veracity confidence judgments than reaction time.  Taken together, the 
results suggested that the plausibility account provided explanation for the data, and 
although fluency still contributed to truth judgments, ease of processing may not be the 
most important factor in producing the illusion of truth effect in all cases. 
Assumptions of the Plausibility Account 
I have not spelled out in detail how plausibility functions, but any model based on 
plausibility needs to do two things:  it has to match the target statement to information in 
memory (the match phase), and it needs to rapidly compare the information in memory to 
the statement to judge plausibility (the check phase).  Similar to Reder’s (1982) 
plausibility account of sentence verification paradigm, I proposed that memory models  
 
49 
 
49 
can shed some light on likely assumptions of a more detailed plausibility theory for 
illusion of truth effect (e.g., ACT-R: Anderson, 2005; SAM: Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; 
Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984). In particular, I speculated that it may work much like 
familiarity-based recognition memory, except instead of evidence accumulating that the 
item was seen before, evidence accumulates about the plausibility of the item. 
Plausibility accounts imply that a full match between the statement and relevant 
information in memory is not necessary to obtain the illusion of truth effect. For the 
match stage, the information is triggered quickly and in greater detail if the targets are 
more (a) temporally recent, (b) strongly associated, and (c) overlapping in content with 
the cue. These assumptions are all true of recognition memory based on familiarity as 
well.  I assume accumulated evidence of plausibility, which is why it predicts an increase 
in plausibility after repetition. During the check stage, people quickly detect 
contradictions or confirmations based on what they know about the target, once a match 
is made (i.e., after the match stage). If the evidence confirms or contradicts the statement, 
people will make the judgment as true or very unlikely to be false/very likely to be true. If 
there is insufficient evidence or disconfirming evidence, people will make the judgment 
as False or very unlikely to be true/very likely to be false.  
The choice to respond either true or false in the check stage depends on whether 
the information in memory contradicts or confirms the statement, and whether it is 
considered sufficient. Like recognition memory, evidence accumulates, but in recognition 
judgments there is only evidence “for” the item being presented before, whereas in 
plausibility, the evidence is whether the evidence is “consistent” with the item being 
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presented or “inconsistent.”  Thus, evidence accumulates both for statements being 
plausible and statements being implausible, not just evidence for the item being old.  
Consistent with the idea that we accumulate evidence of inconsistency, when asked to 
make truth judgments for statements whose content has changed from the initial 
exposure, participants were quick to correctly give a false judgment instead of a faulty 
and inflated truth judgment (Unkelbach & Rom, 2017). Furthermore, it is probably 
crucial that the participants notice that there was a change in the statement, as found in 
recursive reminding literature. When participants are given word pairs A-B at initial 
study and are presented with A-D at test, those who detected a change in the word pair 
showed accurate recognition (Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). 
Post Hoc Analysis Results 
 Though the results of the proposed analyses generally provided evidence in favor 
of the plausibility account’s predictions, I conducted some post-hoc analyses to answer 
some additional questions about plausibility and fluency accounts.  
How comparable is veracity confidence to recognition confidence? The 
plausibility account assumes a familiarity-based recognition type judgment. When 
confidence is lower, the time it takes to make recognition judgments is usually longer (for 
reviews, see Hockley, 2008; Kahana & Loftus, 1999). To test this assumption, I 
conducted a bivariate correlation analysis with the confidence judgment and confidence 
judgment reaction time. The confidence judgment was calculated without the veracity 
values which just reflected the intensity of the confidence. The confidence judgment 
reaction time was the log transformed data that was used in previous analyses. The results 
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found no significant correlation10 between confidence judgments and reaction time, r 
(942) = -.019, p = .566. This is in line with the correlation results found with the veracity-
confidence judgments in Experiment 2, where both the veracity judgment reaction time 
and confidence judgment reaction time were statistically nonsignificant. Confidence in 
veracity judgments does not appear to work exactly the same way as familiarity-based 
recognition judgments do.  
What does it mean to “easily process” information in fluency? A skeptical reader 
might argue that fluency is still the best explanation for our results, and that plausibility is 
nothing but renaming it. Fluency is a construct that depicts the ease with which 
information is processed (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). However, the definition of 
fluency is unclear in the literature: what is ease? Without a clear operational definition of 
processing ease, Unkelbach and Rom (2017) came closest to finding a concrete definition 
of it: response time. The more fluently an item is processed, the quicker the response.  
However, contrary to this interpretation, they found that participants were able to 
make very quick “false” responses. If fluency were the only driving factor in truth 
judgments, then this result should not have been possible (c.f., Unkelbach & Rom, 2017). 
Similarly, when pre-exposed sentences were contradictory to the target statement despite 
the fluent lexical processing, participants showed an illusion of false effect in that their 
truth judgments decreased more so that they thought it to be false. In Experiment 1 of the 
current study, repeated information that contradicted the target statement inflated the 
 
10 An ROC curve analysis showed the same non-significant results. And the results were the same for 
Experiment 1 r (84) = -.091, p = .408.  
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false judgment, inducing an “illusion of falsehood” effect. This would not have been 
possible if the sentence content was simply available and fluent. Participants would have 
to compare what was exposed to them and what the target statement said.  
A fluency theorist could argue that reaction time reflects only “perceptual 
fluency” whereas “conceptual fluency” reflects a general sense of ease, not just reaction 
time.  In typical conceptual fluency studies in recognition, ideas are primed using related 
items, and therefore processed more easily (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Lanska, Olds, & 
Westerman, 2014). Priming increases both hits and false alarms in recognition tests. 
Further, the notion of conceptual fluency would have to be expanded to include a kind of 
anti-conceptual fluency, whereby items also sometimes seem more false when they are 
highly familiar. It is difficult to see how a priming mechanism alone could account for 
this pattern, which suggests content information is necessary for making veracity 
judgments. In Experiment 1 of the current study, the contradicting pre-exposed sentences 
were repeated and had similar lexical familiarity to the statements, but the veracity 
confidence judgments decreased with more repetitions. Participants were able to 
determine the veracity by examining the content congruency between pre-exposed 
sentences and the target statement. 
How is the referential theory different from plausibility? The relationship between 
plausibility and the referential theory (Unkelbach & Rom, 2017; Unkelbach et al., 2019) 
should be further examined. For instance, are conceptually fluent items higher in 
reference connection and therefore are judged to be plausible?  
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Unkelbach and colleagues (2019) discussed a referential theory that suggests the 
number of references between items inflates the truth judgment. When participants were 
asked to think about the relationship between the statements, the truth judgments 
increased as opposed to when they were asked to simply read the statements or report 
which side of the screen the statements were presented on. This finding was discussed in 
terms of greater connection between the references, which the plausibility account would 
suggest is the increased strength and detection in the match phase.  
Could the plausibility measure be reactive? Within the current studies, the 
veracity judgment time differed for Experiment 1 (near 2 s) and Experiment 2 (near 6 s). 
Does adding an instruction of subsequent plausibility rating increase the likelihood of 
spending more time to think through the statement? Previous literature has found that 
rating pre-experimental familiarity (e.g., What/How much do I know about Ernest 
Hemingway?) to the target statement (e.g., Ernest Hemingway was an ambulance driver 
during World War I) affected the truth judgment (Schwartz, 1984). Simply seeing the 
topic (e.g., Statue of Liberty) related to the target statement (e.g., The Statue of Liberty 
faces Southeast) also affected the truth judgment (e.g., Begg et al., 1985). This is 
consistent with the possibility that giving the instructions to participants that they will be 
asked to judge the plausibility of the parts of the statements could affect the veracity 
judgment time. Future studies should separate assessment of plausibility and veracity-
confidence, perhaps by collecting veracity-confidence judgments first without warning 
people that plausibility will be assessed separately after a delay. 
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Implications and Future Directions 
The current study investigated the value of plausibility in explaining the illusion 
of truth effect. However, I believe plausibility could potentially partially explain many 
more phenomena. With “fake news” in the media – especially on social media – 
receiving so much attention lately, understanding the role of information consumers’ 
plausibility judgments in consuming the news has never seemed more important.  
One reason fake news may be shared so often is that it is designed in such a way 
as to meet peoples’ plausibility threshold, by fitting well with their pre-existing beliefs.  
If so, this might lead consumers to spread the news to other people and thereby increase 
the plausibility of the false information to yet more people. In Experiment 1, we see the 
baseline veracity confidence judgments on new statements (0-repetitions in Figure 2) is 
different between the content valence conditions. In recognition memory, the threshold 
for deciding items were old changes depending on the strength of the evidence (e.g., 
Hirshman, 1995), with stronger available evidence leading people to adopt stricter criteria 
for calling items old.  Analogously, in illusion of truth, we might expect peoples’ 
threshold to depend on the relative availability of information, such that we set a stricter 
criterion for calling something true when the available evidence tends to be strong.  
Consistent with this view, in Experiment 1, belief in the new statements was lowest in the 
exact repetition condition. This is the condition where the best match occurs, leading to 
the strongest evidence for the old statements being true. However, when pre-exposed 
sentences that had content valence, even when participants saw the statement for the first 
time, the veracity confidence judgments were high relative to the exact condition. 
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Without proper time and effort to scrutinize the information, the baseline level of 
plausibility presented in a news story could influence the subjective truthfulness of the 
rest of the story to a person, encouraging the spread of false information. Especially on 
social media, such decisions may be made quickly and rely on plausibility and fluency 
rather than sustained thought.  It is worth further investigating the role of System 1 versus 
System 2 processing (e.g., Kahnemann, 2011) in social media sharing decisions.  
A similar point is that one’s background and prior beliefs are likely to influence 
the balance of fluency and plausibility in judging a statement. It is no secret that people 
tend to favor information that confirms their existing beliefs (e.g., Wason, 1968). In some 
cases, personality traits might even affect our plausibility judgment mechanisms. For 
example, people with high levels of schizotypy were more likely to judge a delusional 
statement to be true compared to low-schizotypy controls (e.g, Moritz et al., 2012) – 
because delusional content makes sense to them and seems more plausible.  
Another aspect that can be elaborated on is the relationship between plausibility 
and initial attitudes towards a statement. In the sleeper effect (e.g., for meta-analysis see 
Kumkale & Albarracìn, 2004), where decrease in source memory after a delay increases 
the persuasiveness of the initially discounted information. For example, a statement like 
“iron is atomic number 26” was presented with an uncredulous source (e.g., a student 
who started learning Latin) which initially would make the statement less persuasive. 
However, at a delay, participants forgot who told the statement, but remembers the 
statement itself which makes them feel like it is persuasive.  Plausibility account naturally 
predicts this phenomenon. Plausibility account assumes that temporally recent target, 
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additional information, and cue associations are more likely to be matched easily. The 
statement and source is highly associated with the cue immediately; however, as recency 
fades, statement ceases to strongly associate its source. Therefore, plausibility will predict 
how the participants were likely to judge a statement’s lack of persuasiveness 
immediately after the presentation of statement and uncredulous feedback. After the 
delay the statement is judged to be more persuasive because the cue (i.e., statement or 
parts of the statement) and statement share overlapping content, which therefore remains 
a good match, even though the source information is no longer readily available.  
Plausibility could also be a key mechanism we use to decide whether a statement 
requires elaboration or not. For example, a statement’s agreeableness is rated based on 
the strength of the argument that supports it (e.g., see Elaboration Likelihood Model by 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1980). When the argument strength is left ambiguous and there is no 
other manipulation of strength (e.g., repetition), may affect the participants’ ability or 
motivation to check the plausibility of the arguments will determine their judgments 
about the statements. Recently, a study showed that individual differences (i.e., cognitive 
ability and need for cognition) influenced the illusion of truth effect (De Keersmaeker et 
al., 2019). Need for cognition might help determine the amount of processing time 
devoted to plausibility checking. Similarly, one study found that lack of cognitive ability, 
induced by a cognitive load manipulation increased the likelihood of making illusory 
truth judgments (e.g., Skurnick, Yoon, Park, & Shwartz, 2005). The more highly 
motivated participants were to think about the statements before making the judgments, 
the less susceptible they were to the illusion of truth effect (Garcia-Marques & Silva, 
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2017). There was an overall illusion of truth effect in that repeated statements were 
judged to be truer compared to new statements. However, the effect size decreased when 
the participants in the no-load condition were instructed to be as accurate as possible. 
Without manipulation of the cognitive load, studies looking at people’s predispositions to 
emphasize their feelings in most contexts (Sunbar, Kardes, & Wright, 2015) or to be 
skeptical (Difonzo et al., 2016) found similar results. Participants who utilized their 
feelings more (i.e., high on the Need for Affect – a measure of one’s need to focus on 
their feelings in most contexts as opposed to using logic and careful processing) when 
making truth judgments were more influenced by the repetition effect, in that repeated 
statements were judged to be more truthful. However, for participants who were low on 
the Need for Affect scale, there were no illusion of truth effect found (Sunbar et al., 
2015). Participants low on dispositional skepticism were more affected by more frequent 
repetition whereas participants high in skepticism were less affected (Difonzo et al., 
2016). In sum, it seems the illusion of truth effect could decrease with careful and 
thoughtful processing of the statement before judgment. However, when participants are 
deprived of this cautious thinking, there was room for error in the truth judgment because 
having a sense of plausibility is enough for them to inflate the veracity of the statement.  
In conclusion, this paper proposed that a plausibility mechanism should be added 
onto the current fluency account of illusion of truth. The effect size for perceptual fluency 
is rather small, and there is still variance left that needs further explanation beyond 
perceptual fluency. Robust effects such as the illusion of truth effect are often influenced 
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by multiple mechanisms rather than having one driving factor. The current paper suggests 
that plausibility could be one of these mechanisms in illusion of truth.
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1 
Anchors and Questions used for Judgment Types in all Experiments.  
Judgment Type Question Anchors 
Truth Is the statement true or false? 1. True 
2. False 
Confidence How confident are you about your 
previous response? 
1. I guessed. 
2. I think maybe. 
3. I think so 
4. I’m pretty sure. 
5. I know the answer. 
Plausibility How plausible do you think other UNCG 
students would rate the statement? (Pilot) 
How plausible do you think each 
proposition is? (E2) 
1. Very implausible 
2. Implausible 
3. Plausible 
4. Very plausible. 
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Table 2  
Experiment 1 t-tests for Pre-exposure Sentence Category Differences by Repetition for Confidence-Veracity Judgments (CVJ). 
Pre-exposed content 
valence 0 vs. 1 0 vs. 2 1 vs. 2 
Exact -5.004*** -4.900*** -0.889 
Confirming -3.515** -3.502** 0.402 
Neutral -0.448 0.369 0.034 
Contradicting    0.896 2.140* 2.040a 
  Note. All comparisons’ degrees of freedom were 20.  *p <.05, **p < .01, *** p < .001, a p =.055  
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Table 3  
Experiment 2 t-tests of Confidence-Veracity Judgments, Veracity Judgment Reaction Time for Once Repeated – No Repetition 
by Clarity and Proposition Number.  
 
Proposition Clarity CVJ VJR 
2 Clear 0.724 -1.002 
 Awkward 7.314*** 
-
7.497*** 
3 Clear 1.708 
-
4.070*** 
 Awkward 2.480* 
-
4.022*** 
  Note. All comparisons’ degrees of freedom were 76.  *p< .05, **p <.01, *** p < .001 
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Table 4  
Experiment 2 Correlation Coefficient Matrix. 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. CVJ .267*
** 
.276*
** 
.148*
** 
-.058*
* 
-.072*
** 
-.076*
** 
-.088*
** 
-.047 -.034 
2. Ave. 
Plausibility 
1 .851*
** 
.783*
** 
-.187*
** 
-.157*
** 
-.171*
** 
-.186*
** 
-.049 -.077
* 
3. Min. 
Plausibility 
  1 .417*
** 
-.267*
** 
-.165*
** 
-.212*
** 
-.213*
** 
-.055 -.094
** 
4. Max. 
Plausibility 
    1 -.009 -.080*
** 
-.037 -.066*
* 
-.035 -.002 
5.Total RT       1 .553**
* 
.810**
* 
.778**
* 
.272*
** 
.239*
** 
6. Min. RT         1 .636**
* 
.827**
* 
.256*
** 
.274*
** 
7. Max. RT           1 .948**
* 
.284*
** 
.240*
** 
8. Ave. RT             1 .293*
** 
.271*
** 
9. VRT               1 .316*
** 
10. CRT                 1 
 Note: *p <.05, **p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Table 5 
Regression Coefficients for Reaction Time Data. 
 
Variable B SE B 
Step 1 Constant 2.013 0.232 
 
Minimum Reaction Time -1.307 0.265 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.006  
 F 6.798**  
Notes. *p <.05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 6 
Regression Coefficients for Plausibility Data. 
 Variable B SE B 
Step 1 Constant -1.451 0.175 
 Min. Plausibility 0.926 0.061 
 Adjusted R2 0.076  
 F 228.209***  
Step 2 Constant -2.212 0.285 
 Min. Plausibility 0.0591 0.116 
 Ave. Plausibility 0.536 0.158 
 Adjusted R2 0.079  
 F 120.264***  
 ΔR2 0.004  
Step 3 Constant -2.037 0.294 
 Min. Plausibility 0.27 0.179 
 Ave. Plausibility 1.289 0.357 
 Max. Plausibility -0.471 0.2 
 Adjusted R2 0.081  
 F 82.156***  
 ΔR2 0.002  
Step 4 Constant -2.052 0.294 
 Ave. Plausibility 1.787 0.134 
 Max. Plausibility -0.701 0.13 
 Adjusted R2 0.08  
 F 122.046***  
 ΔR2 -0.001  
          Notes. *p <.05, **p <.01, *** p < .001 
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Table 7 
Regression Coefficients for Plausibility and Reaction Time Data. 
 Variable B SE B 
Step 1 Constant -1.451 0.175 
 Minimum 
Plausibility 
0.926 0.061 
 Adjusted R2 0.076  
 F 228.209***  
Notes. *p <.05, **p <.01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 1. Diagram of Experiment Procedure. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 ANOVA Results of Confidence-Veracity Judgments by Repetition for Pre-exposed Sentences.  
Notes. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3. Histogram of Reaction Time Frequency for Experiment 1 Veracity Judgment Reaction Time. 
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Figure 4. Histogram of Reaction Time Frequency for Experiment 1 Confidence Judgment Reaction Time. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 1 ANOVA Results of Veracity Judgment Reaction Time by Repetition for Pre-exposed Sentences.  
Notes. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 6. Experiment 1 ANOVA Results of Confidence Judgment Reaction Time by Repetition for Pre-exposed Sentences.  
Notes. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 7. Diagram of Experiment 2 Procedure. 
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 ANOVA Results of Veracity Confidence Judgments by Repetition and Clarity for Statements with 2 and 3 
Propositions.  
Notes. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 9. Histogram of Reaction Time Frequency for Experiment 2 Veracity Judgment Reaction Time. 
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Figure 10. Histogram of Reaction Time Frequency for Experiment 2 Confidence Judgment Reaction Time. 
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Figure 11. Experiment 2 ANOVA Results of Veracity Judgment Reaction Time by Repetition and Clarity for Statements with 2 and 3 
Propositions.  
Notes. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 12. Experiment 2 ANOVA results of Confidence Judgment Reaction Time by Repetition and Clarity for Statements with 2 and 
3 Propositions.  
Notes. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
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APPENDIX B 
PILOT STIMULI 
TRUE acc conf plau False 1 acc conf plau False 2 acc conf plau 
Iron is atomic 
number 26. 61% 1 3 27 56% 1 3 25 39% 1 3 
CNN began 
telecasting TV news 
in 1980. 
83% 2 3 NBC 44% 2 3 Fox News 39% 1 3 
Space Shuttle 
Challenger broke 
apart 73 seconds into 
its flight on January 
28, 1986. 
67% 1 3 Apollo 33% 1 3 Mercury 50% 1 2 
An Ugli fruit is what 
you get if you cross a 
grapefruit, an orange 
and a tangerine. 
22% 1 2 Kumquat 78% 1 3 Lychee 67% 3 3 
Iron oxide gives Mars 
its reddish 
appearance. 
89% 4 3 Lead tetroxide 28% 3 3 Copper Floride 56% 1 2 
The Michelin Man is 
associated with tires. 94% 5 4 biscuits 83% 5 1 Candles 83% 5 4 
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The Woodstock 
festival was held at 
Max Yasgur's dairy 
farm during 3 days in 
1969. 
67% 1 3 Treasure Island 39% 1 2 Texxas Jam 67% 1 2 
Blue mountain coffee 
comes from Jamaica. 28% 1 3 Columbia 44% 1 2 Costa Rica 44% 1 3 
The film Mamma Mia 
(2008) starred Pierce 
Brosnan.  
83% 2 3 Collin Farrell 33% 1 3 Hugh Grant 33% 1 3 
Stegosaurus means 
roof lizard. 44% 1 3 Triceratops 61% 1 2 Pterydactyl 72% 4 2 
Lee Van Cleef played 
the role of 'the Bad' in 
the 1966 Spaghetti 
Western, The Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly. 
56% 1 3 Clint Eastwood 67% 1 3 Eli Wallach 33% 1 3 
The Spanish flag 
consists of red and 
yellow. 
94% 5 3 Red & Green 44% 4 3 Green &Yellow 50% 5 2 
The flag of Libya has 
the colors red, green, 
and black. 
78% 3 3 Red, green, yellow 28% 1 3 
Red, blue, 
black 28% 1 3 
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There are 4 C's that 
describe the 
properties of a 
diamond. 
67% 3 3 3 22% 1 3 5 56% 1 3 
Maman by Louise 
Bourgeois is a 
sculpture of a spider. 
17% 1 2 giraffe 44% 1 1 Horse 72% 1 2 
NASA stands for 
National Aeronautics 
and Space 
Administration. 
78% 4 3 
National 
Astronomical 
Science 
Association 
33% 4 3 
National 
Astronomy 
Science 
Administration 
11% 4 4 
For 9 years, future 
military strongman 
Idi Amin was 
Uganda's 
heavyweight boxing 
champion. 
67% 1 3 Tanzania 33% 1 3 Rwanda 56% 1 3 
The name of the 
lioness in the book 
Born Free is Elsa. 
44% 1 2 Anna 50% 1 3 Emma 28% 1 2 
10 Downing Street is 
the official address of 
Britain's prime 
minister. 
50% 1 3  24 Sussex Ave. 67% 1 2 
221-B Baker 
st. 33% 1 3 
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In a rainbow, red is at 
the outer part of the 
arch. 
83% 5 4 violet 72% 5 2 orange 44% 2 4 
Scurvy is a disease 
caused by a 
deficiency in Vitamin 
C. 
72% 4 3 B 33% 1 2 D 72% 2 2 
The hawksbill turtle 
belongs to the 
Cheloniidae family. 
22% 1 2 Tuethida 72% 1 3 Nephropidae 72% 1 2 
Matt Frewer 
portrayed the 
character Max 
Headroom. 
50% 1 2 Harrison Ford 50% 1 2 Christopher Lambert 50% 2 3 
Machu Picchu 
translates to old peak 
in English. 
89% 2 3 Hidden temple 44% 1 3 Stone village 39% 1 3 
Mickey Dolenz, 
Michael Nesmith, 
Peter Tork, and Davy 
Jones were members 
of the band The 
Monkees. 
72% 1 3 The Animals 44% 1 1 The Buggles 39% 1 2 
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There are a total of 
88 keys on a modern 
piano. 
83% 1 3 87 56% 2 3 86 33% 2 3 
Mel Blanc voiced the 
cartoon character 
Bugs Bunny. 
83% 1 3 Don Messick 22% 1 3 Joseph Barbera 17% 1 3 
There are 4 faces in a 
tetrahedon. 50% 4 3 3 72% 1 2 5 67% 5 3 
The Vikings captured 
York in 866 AD. 50% 1 3 The Romans 61% 1 3 The Normans 44% 2 3 
The nearest island 
country to Puerto 
Rico is the 
Dominican Republic.  
89% 3 3 Trinidad 17% 1 3 Cuba 61% 3 3 
Dom Perignon was 
the Benedictine monk 
who invented 
champagne. 
11% 1 2 Moscatto 28% 1 3 Pinot-Griggio 61% 2 2 
Lake Superior is the 
largest freshwater 
lake in the world. 
67% 4 3 Great Salt Lake 61% 1 3 Lake Huron 44% 3 3 
Mount Everest is the 
highest point on the 
28% 1 2 K2 56% 1 3 Annapurna 11% 4 4 
 
 
 
90 
Earth's continental 
crust. 
Jack Ruby shot and 
killed Lee Harvey 
Oswald. 
56% 1 2 Jack Opal 50% 2 3 Jack Jade 56% 1 2 
Jolly Green Giant is 
the mirthful verdant 
colossus was created 
in 1926 by the 
Minnesota Valley 
Canning Company. 
56% 1 2 Gulliver 67% 1 2 Paul Bunyan 33% 3 3 
In Dutch folklore, 
Antigoon the giant 
was defeated by a 
young Roman soldier 
Brabo. 
39% 1 2 Boeman 17% 1 2 Klaas Vaak 61% 1 3 
The Greek word for 
diamond means 
unbreakable. 
72% 2 3 priceless 39% 1 3 Precious 11% 2 3 
Digitails is a plant 
commonly known as 
foxglove. 
28% 1 2 penstemon 56% 1 2 Campanula 72% 1 3 
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Napolean Bonaparte 
died in the battle of 
Trafalgar. 
61% 2 2 Horatio Nelson 50% 1 3 Charles Martel 56% 1 3 
The Pacific Ocean is 
the deepest ocean in 
the world. 
44% 4 3 Atlantic Ocean 28% 2 3 Arctic Ocean 28% 2 3 
Glinda is the name of 
one of the good 
witches in the Wizard 
of Oz. 
94% 5 4 Gelinda 22% 5 4 Glenda 28% 1 3 
Mercury is not a gas 
at room temperature. 39% 4 3 Hydrogen 83% 3 3 Helium 56% 4 3 
The islands 
Hokkaido, Honshu, 
Shikoku and Kyushu 
are part of Japan. 
56% 2 3 South Korea 33% 2 3 Vietnam 17% 3 3 
In 2006, Pluto 
became reclassified 
as a dwarf planet. 
61% 3 3 Mini planet 33% 4 3 Semi planet 17% 4 3 
Aldous Huxley wrote 
Brave New World. 56% 1 3 
Thomas 
Hardy 50% 1 3 
D. H. 
Lawrence 33% 1 3 
The largest 
contiguous land 
83% 3 2 Roman Empire 22% 4 3 Persian Empire 33% 1 3 
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empire in history was 
the Mongol Empire. 
David Howell Evans 
is more widely 
known by his stage 
name: The Edge. 
28% 1 3 The Cliff 61% 1 2 The Line 67% 1 3 
As of 2016, there 
were 28 sports in the 
summer Olympics. 
83% 1 3 34 28% 1 3 48 39% 2 3 
Robert Baden-Powell 
was the founder of 
the Scout Movement. 
44% 1 3 H. G. Wells 39% 1 3 Winston Churchill 61% 1 3 
Ginger wine is made 
from ginger and 
raisins. 
56% 2 3 chocolate 72% 1 2 Stout 39% 1 3 
Lapsang Souchong is 
a type of tea. 39% 1 2 
Type of 
language 78% 1 3 Breed of dog 56% 1 3 
The Italian city Pisa 
has the famous 
leaning tower. 
56% 5 3 Florence 33% 4 3 Rome 17% 4 3 
Red tea has the least 
amount of caffeine 
among the types of 
tea.  
33% 3 3 highest 61% 3 3 White tea 50% 1 3 
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The stone Blue John 
was found in 
Castleton, UK.  
50% 1 3 Inverness, UK 72% 1 2 Kendal, UK 39% 1 3 
Swaziland's 
government is an 
absolute monarchy.  
50% 1 2 Communist oligarchy 50% 1 3 
Absolute 
Theocracy 50% 1 2 
In the film Forrest 
Gump, Forrest taught 
Elvis Presley a new 
way to dance. 
39% 1 3 Fred Astaire 56% 4 3 Ginger Rogers 56% 1 3 
Dry air roughly 
contains about 78% 
of nitrogen in 
volume. 
50% 2 3 0.58 44% 3 3 0.38 28% 4 3 
Nicaragua is the 
largest country in 
Central America. 
44% 1 3 Guatemala 67% 2 3 Honduras 56% 3 3 
Tchaikovsky 
composed The 
Nutcracker. 
56% 3 3 Beethoven 50% 4 3 Mozart 44% 1 3 
Simon De Bon is the 
lead singer of the 
band Duran Duran. 
39% 1 3 Mar Almond 56% 1 3 Tony Hadley 50% 1 2 
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James Blunt's second 
album title is All the 
Lost Souls. 
72% 1 3 Brave Souls 44% 1 3 Sad souls 28% 1 3 
Capricorn is one of 
the earth signs. 72% 4 3 Leo 33% 5 4 Scorpio 44% 4 4 
Tulips were once 
exchanged as a form 
of currency. 
28% 3 2 Roses 72% 4 3 Lilies 61% 1 2 
The winner of each 
stage of the Tour de 
France wears a 
yellow jersey in the 
next stage. 
50% 1 3 green 33% 1 3 White 44% 1 3 
The Cannes Film 
Festival was founded 
in 1946. 
72% 1 3 1898 28% 1 3 1981 17% 1 3 
As of 2018, there are 
6 James Bond movies 
that have just one 
word in the title. 
67% 2 3 5 56% 3 3 7 39% 1 3 
Mozart composed 
The Marriage of 
Figaro. 
39% 1 2 Puccinni 50% 2 2 Liszt 50% 1 3 
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A squirrel's nest is 
called a drey. 72% 1 3 eyrie 61% 1 3 sett 56% 1 2 
Sports car 
manufacturer Ferrari 
is based in Maranello, 
Italy. 
83% 3 3 Verona 11% 4 3 Ferrara 11% 3 3 
The TGV (the French 
high-speed train) 
stands for Train a 
Grande Vitesse. 
39% 1 3 
Tactique 
Geographique 
Vierra 
50% 1 3 Transport e Grandiose 28% 1 3 
The medical term for 
lockjaw is tetanus. 39% 1 3 Rubella 72% 4 3 Mumps 100% 4 3 
The poker player Gus 
Hansen's nickname is 
The Great Dane. 
56% 1 3 Straightjack Gus 56% 1 2 The Devillish 39% 1 2 
Graham's number is a 
power tower of 3. 39% 1 3 2 61% 1 2 5 50% 1 2 
CIA stands for 
Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
28% 3 3 
Covert 
International 
Agency 
17% 5 4 
Centralized 
International 
Association 
78% 4 3 
The common name 
for Impatiens 
walleriana is busy 
Lizzie. 
28% 1 2 Cuckooflower 83% 1 2 Foxglove 72% 1 2 
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Rice Krispies are 
represented by these 
characters: Crackle, 
Pop, and Snap. 
33% 5 3 boom 11% 5 3 Snack 50% 5 4 
India won the Hockey 
World Cup in 1975. 39% 1 3 Pakistan 72% 1 3 Germany 44% 1 3 
The lion was lacking 
a heart in the Wizard 
of Oz. 
89% 5 3 Tin man 44% 4 3 Scarecrow 61% 5 3 
Lewis Wallace is the 
author of Ben-Hur. 39% 1 3 Bernard Shaw 61% 1 2 Victor Hugo 50% 1 3 
Quercus is the Latin 
name of an oak tree. 72% 1 3 Greek coin 61% 1 3 Red squirrel 56% 1 3 
The shamrock is the 
national flower of 
Ireland. 
89% 1 3 The marigold 28% 4 3 The daffodil 17% 2 3 
Switzerland is a 
landlocked country. 39% 1 2 Spain 28% 1 3 France 72% 1 3 
The Hope Diamond 
is the largest blue 
diamond in the world 
at 45 carats and is 
said to be cursed. 
72% 1 2 The star of Africa 39% 1 2 Koh-l-noor 44% 1 3 
 
 
 
97 
The birthplace of the 
fictional detective 
Hercule Poirot is 
Belgium. 
39% 1 2 France 39% 1 2 England 61% 1 2 
More than 10% of the 
world's Muslims live 
in Indonesia. 
72% 1 3 Iran 67% 1 3 Saudi Arabia 33% 2 3 
A Rhode Island Red 
is a breed of chicken. 39% 1 3 duck 72% 1 2 Pig 78% 1 3 
In Star Trek, Captain 
Kirk's middle name is 
Tiberius 
67% 1 3 Thaddeus 39% 1 3 Tadleigh 39% 1 3 
Cuneiform script is 
the earliest known 
writing system in the 
world. 
50% 1 3 Prakirt script 44% 3 3 Sanskript 39% 1 3 
In the 1971 film Dirty 
Harry, Clint 
Eastwood's 
character's last name 
is Callahan. 
50% 1 3 Colt 28% 1 3 Carnegie 50% 1 3 
Gold is the chemical 
element that has the 
atomic number of 79. 
44% 2 3 Silver 44% 1 3 Nickel 39% 1 3 
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Brazil is the only 
Portugese speaking 
country in the 
Americas. 
22% 1 3 Argentina 50% 4 3 Colombia 78% 3 3 
Wellington is the 
capital of New 
Zealand. 
72% 1 3 Auckland 50% 1 2 Christchurch 61% 1 3 
Lake Allatoona is in 
the state of Georgia. 56% 1 3 Alabama 67% 1 2 Colorado 39% 1 3 
The capital city of 
Estonia is Tallinn. 61% 1 2 Vilnius 50% 1 2 Riga 39% 1 3 
The musical 
instrument trumpet 
has three valves. 
72% 1 3 four 28% 2 3 Two 67% 4 3 
Catherine of Aragon 
was Henry VIII's first 
wife. 
56% 1 3 second 39% 1 3 third 22% 1 3 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT 1 STIMULI 
Target Confirming Neutral Contradicting 
Iron is atomic number 
26. 
The atomic number is 
determined by the number 
of protons. 
Iron can be found in your 
blood stream. 
Iron is a metal in the first 
transition series. 
 (61% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Iron has 26 protons. Dark leafy greens are good sources of iron. 
The mass number of Iron is 
55.845. 
CNN began telecasting 
TV news in 1980. 
CNN was founded by 
American media proprietor 
Ted Turner. 
The latest news can be found 
on CNN. 
CNN was founded after 
NBC. 
(83% acc, conf 2, plau 3) 
First television channel to 
provide 24 hour coverage 
was CNN. 
CNN is popular news 
broadcasting station. 
CNN began telecasting TV 
sports news in 1980. 
Space Shuttle Challenger 
broke apart 73 seconds 
into its flight on January 
28, 1986. 
Nasa knew that the design 
of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger could fail prior 
to the event.  
The Space Shuttle 
Challenger was going to 
orbit around the earth.  
The flight of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger was 
successful for 9 missions. 
 (67% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Ronald Reagan issued a 
special investigation into the 
Space Shuttle Challenger 
accident. 
There is a mvie about the 
Space Shuttle Challenger. 
The Apollo 13 mission has 
been dramatized multiple 
times. 
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The Woodstock festival 
was held at Max Yasgur's 
dairy farm during 3 days 
in 1969. 
Many people gathered for 
the first Woodstock 
Festival. 
Many artists perform at the 
Woodstock Festival.  
The Woodstock festival was 
referred to as 3 days of 
Peace & Music. 
(67% acc, conf 1, plau 3) the Woodstock Festival first began in 1969 
The Woodstock festival will 
celebrate it's 50th 
anniversary this year.  
The Woodstock Festival of 
1969 was held at a 600-acre 
dairy in Bethel, New York. 
Blue mountain coffee 
comes from Jamaica. 
The Blue mountains is near 
Kingston where some of the 
highest mountains in the 
Caribbean are located. 
Blue Mountain coffee comes 
in different roasts.  
The coffee plants are 
originated in Ethiopia. 
(28% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Jamaica is known for their gourmet products.  
Blue Mountain coffee is very 
expensive. 
Jamaica grows just 0.1% of 
the world’s coffee. 
The film Mamma Mia 
(2008) starred Pierce 
Brosnan.  
Pierce Brosnan stepped out 
of his usual role when he 
joined the musical film, 
Mamma Mia (2008). 
The film Mamma Mia (2008) 
is a romantic musical. 
Pierce Brosnan is famous 
for the James Bond role. 
 (83% acc, conf 2, plau 3) 
Pierce Brosnan has won 
multiple acting related 
rewards and was famous for 
his role of James Bond. 
The film Mamma Mia (2008) 
was made into a sequel. 
The American singer, Cher, 
starred in the movie 
Mamma Mia (2008), and 
played as Ruby Sheridan. 
Lee Van Cleef played the 
role of 'the Bad' in the 
1966 Spaghetti Western, 
The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly. 
Lee can Cleef starred in 
multiple Western movies 
throughout his career. 
"If you work for a living, 
why do you kill yourself 
working?" is a popular quote 
from the movie “the Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly.”  
Lee Van Cleef was best 
known for playing in the 
spaghetti western, For a 
Few Dollars More. 
   
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Lee Van Cleef achieved 
stardom in 1965 which 
lasted 12 years.  
Tuco the Ugly was a main 
character in the film The 
good, the Bad and the Ugly. 
Clint Eastwood played the 
role of "the Good" in The 
Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly. 
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The flag of Libya has the 
colors red, green, and 
black. 
The Pan African flag is red, 
green, and black.  
The flag Libya has a simple 
design. 
The flag of Libya contains a 
white crescent moon and 
star. 
(78% acc, conf 3, plau 3) Lybia was an early center of Christianity. 
Libya's flag symbolizes 
independence. 
The Flag of the Great 
Socialist People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya was a plain 
green flag. 
Maman by Louise 
Bourgeois is a sculpture 
of a spider. 
Maman by Louise 
Bourgeois was and ode to 
her mother. 
Louise Bourgeois is well-
known for large scale 
sculptures. 
Louise Bourgeois was a 
painter and printmaker. 
(17% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
The spider is supposed to be 
a symbol of strength and 
protection.  
Louise Bourgeois began her 
life as an artist in Paris, 
France. 
Plenty of Louise 
Bourgeois's work displayed 
themes of sexuality and 
body. 
For 9 years, future 
military strongman Idi 
Amin was Uganda's 
heavyweight boxing 
champion. 
Idi Amin, the former 
President of Uganda was 
described as very tall and 
well built. 
Idi Amin began boxing when 
he was serving in the 
military. 
Idi Admin was the president 
of Uganda and was 
notorious for his 
oppressiveness. 
(67% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
His first championship was 
as the lightweight boxing 
champion. 
Idi Amin was a highly 
ranked soldier in the 
military. 
Idi Amin left school with 
only a fourth grade English 
language education. 
The name of the lioness 
in the book Born Free is 
Elsa. 
Born free was also made 
into a British drama film in 
1966 starting Virginia 
McKenna. 
Born Free is a book about the 
experiences of raising a lion 
cub. 
The book born free is based 
on a true story in Kenya. 
(44% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Joy and George Adamson, a 
real-life couple raised the 
lioness. 
The book Born Free was 
made into a movie in the 
1960s. 
The real name of the lion 
that starred in the movie 
Born Free is Ugas. 
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10 Downing Street is the 
official address of 
Britain's prime minister. 
Downing Street has 
traditionally been occupied 
by Britain's prime ministers.  
Britain's current prime 
minister is Theresa May. 
12 Downing Street is the 
official address of Britain's 
prime minister. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
The address 10 Downing 
Street is nearly 300 years 
old and holds much 
significance. 
Theresa May has been 
Britain's prime minister since 
2016. 
10 Downing Street is the 
official address of Jamaica's 
prime minister. 
The hawksbill turtle 
belongs to the 
Cheloniidae family. 
Hawksbill turtles are 
extremely endangered. 
The hawksbill turtle is 
critically endangered. 
Cheloniidae family has 
round shells and paddle like 
flippers. 
(22% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Sea turtles in the 
Cheloniidae family migrate 
thousands of miles a year in 
order to breed.  
Hawksbill turtles live in 
rocky and shallow coastal 
areas. 
There are six species of 
turtles that belong to the 
Cheloniidae family. 
Matt Frewer portrayed 
the character Max 
Headroom. 
Matt Frewer has played 
pivotal roles in dozens of 
films throughout his career 
Max Headroom is a fictional 
artificial intelligence 
character.  
Matt Ford portrayed the 
character Max Headroom 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Matt Frewer graduated 
acting school in the early 
1980's. 
The Max Headroom Show 
was a television series in the 
UK. 
Matt Ford portrayed the dog 
Max Headroom 
Machu Picchu translates 
to old peak in English. 
Machu Piccu is located on a 
mountain ridge that is 2,430 
metres high. 
Machu Picchu is a citadel in 
the Andes Mountains.  
Machu Picchu translates to 
big peak in Engish 
(89% acc, conf 2, plau 3) 
Often mistakenly referred to 
as "Lost City of the Incas", 
Machu Picchu was brought 
to attention by an American 
historian in 1911. 
The former use of Machu 
Picchu is a mystery. 
Machu Picchu was 
abandoned during the 
Spanish Conquest. 
Mickey Dolenz, Michael 
Nesmith, Peter Tork, and 
Davy Jones were 
The Monkees were a band 
with four members. 
Davy Jones was the lead 
singer of his band, backed up 
One of the members of the 
band Monkees told a lie to 
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members of the band The 
Monkees. 
by Mickey Dolenz, Michael 
Nesmith, and Peter Tork. 
the reporter that they sold 
more than the Beetles.  
(72% acc, conf 1, plau 3) The Monkees were a pop rock band. 
Mickey Dolenz, Michael 
Nesmith, Peter Tork, and 
Davy Jones were all 
members of a popular rock 
band. 
There was more than one 
drummer in the band the 
Monkees. 
There are a total of 88 
keys on a modern piano. 
The piano has an even 
number of keys total. 
It takes a lot of skill to play 
the modern piano. 
There total number of keys 
on a modern piano is an odd 
number. 
(83% acc, conf 1, plau 3) There are black and white keys on a piano. 
Deep bass and high treble 
notes can be played on the 
modern piano. 
The Imperial Concert Grand 
Bosendorfer piano has 97 
keys. 
Mel Blanc voiced the 
cartoon character Bugs 
Bunny. 
Mel Blanc was often 
referred to as the "Man of a 
Thousand Voices" 
Bugs Bunny is famous 
character in the show Looney 
Toons. 
Bugs bunny was voiced by 
Greg Burson in the 1990s. 
(83% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Mel Blanc voiced dozens of classic cartoon characters. 
Bugs Bunny is characterized 
by his Brooklyn accent and 
most known for his catch 
phrase, "eh, what's up doc?" 
Mel Blanc was well known 
for his role as Barney 
Rubble of the Flintstones. 
The Vikings captured 
York in 866 AD. 
Vikings tended to raid 
European areas quite 
regularly  
York is a historic walled city 
in North Yorkshire, England. 
Two Vikings ascended to 
the throne of England 1013-
1035 AD. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 3) The viking age dated back to 790 A.D- 1066 A.D. 
York is most known for its 
13th-century gothic 
cathedral, York Minister. 
The Viking Age may be 
expanded to North 
Germanic dominance 
including Scandinavian 
York. 
The nearest island 
country to Puerto Rico is 
the Dominican Republic. 
Both Puerto Rico and the 
Dominican Republic are 
part of a group of Island 
Puerto Rico is a US territory 
and is a popular tourist 
destination.  
The furthest island country 
to Puerto Rico is the 
Dominican Republic. 
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countries in the Caribbean 
Sea.   
(89% acc, conf 3, plau 3) 
The Dominican Republic is 
the smallest island of the 
Greater Antilles island 
chain. 
San Juan is the capital of 
Puerto Rica and was founded 
in 1521. 
Cuba is the nearest island 
country to Puerto Rico. 
Dom Perignon was the 
Benedictine monk who 
invented champagne. 
Dom Perignon is a popular 
brand of champagne. 
Champagne was 
unintentionally invented in 
1693. 
Benedictine Monks 
observed abstinence. 
(11% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Champagne is known to 
have been accidentally 
created by a monk in 1600s 
Champagne is a sparkling 
wine and is often served at 
celebratory events. 
Christopher Merret was the 
first to document wine with 
sugar added to be "sparkling 
wine". 
An Ugli fruit is what you 
get if you cross a 
grapefruit, an orange, and 
a tangerine. 
An Ugli fruit looks like an 
uglier version of an orange 
which is why it got its 
name. 
The highest point on Earth's 
continental crust is almost 
30,000 feet above sea level.  
An Ugli fruit is often 
guessed to be a lemon-
tangerine hybrid. 
 (22% acc, conf 1, plau 2) An Ugli fruit is known to be less bitter than a grapefruit. 
Several adventurists attempt 
to climb the highest point on 
Earth every year.  
A pomelo is often used for 
an Ugli fruit hybridization. 
Jack Ruby shot and killed 
Lee Harvey Oswald. 
Jack Ruby was jailed on 
March 14, 1964. 
Lee Harvey Oswald was shot 
and killed in 1963. 
Lee Harvey Oswald 
assassinated John F. 
Kennedy. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 2) Ruby died in Jail after his murder conviction. 
Lee Harvey Oswald 
assassinated the 35th US 
president. 
Jack Ruby was a Dallas 
Texas Nightclub owner at 
the time of JFK's 
assassination. 
Jolly Green Giant is the 
mirthful verdant colossus 
was created in 1926 by 
The jolly green giant was 
created in response to the 
discovery of a new type of 
The Minnesota Valley 
Canning Company was 
founded in 1903 in Le Sueur, 
Minnesota. 
Jolly Green Giant is the 
dejected verdant colossus 
was created in 1926 by the 
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the Minnesota Valley 
Canning Company. 
pea which was especially 
large.  
Minnesota Valley Canning 
Company. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Minnesota Valley Canning 
Company was popular for 
its canned vegetables. 
Minnesota Valley Canning 
Company mas a mass 
producer of canned corn and 
peas. 
The Minnesota Valley 
Canning Company was 
renamed to the Green Giant 
Company in 1950. 
In Dutch folklore, 
Antigoon the giant was 
defeated by a young 
Roman soldier Brabo. 
This is an origin story for 
the city of Antwerp and that 
is where the statue is 
located. 
There is a monument 
dedicated to the Roman 
soldier Brabo in Belgium. 
In Greek folklore, Antigoon 
the giant was defeated by a 
young Roman soldier 
Brabo. 
(39% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
A statue is of Brabo holding 
up Antigoon's hand which 
he cut off.  
Brabo is a character in Dutch 
folklore that is known for 
defeating the giant. 
The Antwerp fountain is at 
Antwerp where the mythical 
giant Antigoon lived. 
The Greek word for 
diamond means 
unbreakable. 
Diamonds are a notoriously 
strong gem. 
Diamonds are the birth stone 
for the month of April.  
Natural diamonds and 
imitation diamonds can be 
distinguished using optical 
techniques. 
(72% acc, conf 2, plau 3) 
Diamonds were rarely used 
pre 1300s due to the 
material being very difficult 
to work with. 
Diamonds have become 
known to symbolize love and 
fidelity. 
The element carbon with its 
atoms arranged in a crystal 
structure is called diamond 
cubic. 
Digitails is a plant 
commonly known as 
foxglove. 
The flower Digitalis is 
shaped like a finger and 
actually covers up a person's 
finger. 
Digitalis can be used to treat 
heart failure by increasing 
blood flow. 
The genus of the plant 
Digitalis is placed in the 
figwort family. 
(28% acc, conf 1, plau 2) Digitalis in Latin translates to "finger-like" 
Digitalis can be found in a 
wide range of colors. 
The colors of the Digitalis is 
various from pink to light 
grey. 
Mount Everest is the 
highest point on the 
Earth's continental crust. 
The summit of mount 
Everest has a larger 
The Battle of Trafalgar took 
place on October 21, 1805.  
K2 is known as the Savage 
Mountain as it is extremely 
hard to climb. 
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atmospheric pressure than 
any other mountain 
(28% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Mount Everest is one of the 
most dangerous mountains 
to climb.  
The battle of Trafalgar was 
fought by the British Royal 
Navy against the combined 
fleets of the French and 
Spanish Navies. 
Mountains near the equator 
are technically higher than 
those in other areas. 
The islands Hokkaido, 
Honshu, Shikoku and 
Kyushu are part of Japan. 
Japan is a made up of 
multiple large islands. 
Hokkaido is known for its 
volcanoes and natural hot 
springs. 
About 45km north to 
Hokkaido lies Sakhalin 
Island, Russia. 
(56% acc, conf 2, plau 3) Japan is not located on a single landmass. 
Shikoku is an island home to 
8 of the pilgrimage temples. 
The Chinese characters for 
Shikoku literally means 4 
provinces and Kyushu 
means 9 islands. 
Aldous Huxley wrote 
Brave New World. 
Aldous Huxley was a 
famous writer and 
philosopher. 
Brave New World is a 
dystopian novel published in 
1932. 
Aldous Huxley was a 
character in Brave New 
World. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Aldous Huxley was the author of nearly 50 books. 
The book Brave New World 
was made into a movie in 
1998. 
Aldous Huxley directed 
Brave New World. 
David Howell Evans is 
more widely known by 
his stage name: The 
Cliff. 
David Howell Evans is a 
famous rock guitarist 
David Howell Evans is an 
Irish musician and 
songwriter.  
David Howell Evans is 
more widely known by his 
stage name: The Edge. 
(61% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
David Howell Evan's 
nickname derives from the 
shape of his head. 
David Howell Evans has 
recorded 14 studio albums 
with the band U2. 
David Howell Evans is most 
known for being member of 
the band U2. 
As of 2016, there were 
34 sports in the summer 
Olympics. 
There were a number of 
additions to Olympic sports 
in 2016. 
The summer Olympics is an 
event held every four years.  
There are an odd number of 
sports in the summer 
Olympics in honor of the 
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odd numbered Olympic 
rings. 
(28% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Olympic sports haven't been removed in decades. 
The next summer Olympics 
will take place on July 24, 
2020. 
Only five sports have been 
contested at every summer 
Olympic Games since 1896. 
Winston Churchill was 
the founder of the Scout 
Movement. 
The scout movement was 
founded in the 1940s. 
The Scout Movement has 
over 50 million participants. 
Lord Baden-Powell was the 
founder of the Scout 
Movement. 
(61% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
The scout movement was 
created in response to 
WWII. 
The Scout Movement was 
founded in 1922 in Paris, 
France. 
Winston Churchill led 
Britain through World War 
II. 
Ginger wine is made 
from ginger and 
chocolate. 
Ginger wine Is known to 
have two key ingredients. 
Ginger wine was first 
produced in England. 
Ginger wine is made from 
ginger and raisins. 
(72% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
The fat in the chocolate and 
water in alcohol repel each 
other. 
Ginger wine is believed to 
help relieve flu symptoms.  
Sales of Ginger Wine 
boosted in the 19th Century 
due to a Cholera epidemic. 
Lapsang Souchong is a 
breed of dog. 
Laspang Souchong 
originated from 
mountainous regions of 
china as guide dogs. 
Lapsang Souchong originates 
from Fujian, China. 
Lapsang Souchong is a tea 
well-known as the "tea for 
Westerners".  
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Laspang Souchong is a 
popular breed of dog in 
Asia. 
Dog breeds are sometimes 
named after a location.  
Lapsang Souchong is not on 
the American Kellen Club's 
official list of dog breeds. 
The stone Blue John was 
found in Inverness, UK.  
Blue John is a type of rare 
stone. 
Blue John is a semi-precious 
mineral that is only found in 
Blue John Cavern.  
Inverness, UK is the largest 
city of the Scottish 
Highlands that used to have 
great food markets. 
(72% acc, conf 1, plau 2) Blue John are only found in the UK 
The stone Blue John is 
believed to be first 
discovered by the Romans. 
The stone Green John is 
found only in Green Valley. 
 
 
 
108 
Swaziland's government 
is an absolute theocracy.  
Swaziland keeps traditions a 
core part of their political 
system. 
Swaziland has two capitals, 
Mbabane and Lobamba.  
Afghanistan's government is 
an absolute theocracy. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Many countries today still 
use theocracy as a form of 
their government. 
Swaziland is located in 
southern Africa and is known 
for it's wilderness reserves. 
The Swaziland's current 
king has 15 wives. 
In the film Forrest Gump, 
Forrest taught Ginger 
Rogers a new way to 
dance. 
Forrest Gump is known to 
be a great dancer. 
In the film Forrest Gump, 
Forrest is known for his 
famous line "life is like a box 
of chocolates, you never 
know what you're gonna 
get." 
In the film Forrest Gump, 
we see Elvis Presely dance. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
One of the most popular 
scenes in the film is when 
Forrest teaches a boy how to 
dance. 
In the film Forrest Gump, 
Forrest received a Medal of 
Honor after fighting in the 
Vietnam War  
In the film Forrest Gump, 
Jenny taught Forrest a new 
way to dance. 
Tony Hadley is the lead 
singer of the band Duran 
Duran. 
Duran Duran is a famous 
band that formed in the 
1970s. 
Duran Duran was a band 
formed in Birmingham in 
1978.  
Simon Le Bon is the lead 
singer in the band Duran 
Duran. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 2) Duran Duran have 4 members. 
"A View to the Kill" was a 
popular song by the band 
Duran Duran. 
Tony Hadley is the lead 
singer of the band Spandau 
Ballet. 
James Blunt's second 
album title is All the 
Brave Souls. 
James Blunt is a singer and 
songwriter known for his 
ballads. 
James Blunt's real name is 
James Hillier Blount and he 
rose to fame in 2004. 
James Blunt's second album 
title is All the Lost Souls. 
(44% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
James Blunt is most well 
known for his song "You're 
beautiful". 
James Blunt is an English 
singer-songwriter, record 
producer and former British 
Army Officer 
James Blunt's third album 
was titled Some Kind of 
Trouble. 
The winner of each stage 
of the Tour de France 
The Tour de France 
implemented rules to help 
The Tour de France is an 
annual men's bicycle race. 
The winner of each stage of 
the Tour de France wears a 
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wears a white jersey in 
the next stage. 
keep track of the current 
lead for each stage after 
having a hard time keeping 
track.  
yellow jersey in the next 
stage. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Special jerseys are awarded 
to individuals who display 
extraordinary performance 
in the Tour de France. 
The winner of each stage in 
the Tour de France wears a 
different colored jersey in the 
following stages. 
In one of the classifications 
of the Tour de France, the 
winner wears a white jersey 
with red polka dots. 
The Cannes Film Festival 
was founded in 1898. 
This festival was held just 
10 years after the first 
motion film 
The Cannes Film Festival is 
held in France each year 
which previews new films of 
all genres.  
The Cannes Film Festival 
was founded in 1946. 
(28% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
The first kinetoscope film 
shown publicly was made in 
1893. 
The Cannes Film Festival 
was originally called the 
International film festival.  
More films were made in 
color in the Mid 1950's. 
Liszt composed The 
Marriage of Figaro 
The opera Marriage of 
Figaro is written in Italian 
while the composer was not 
Italian.  
The Marriage of Figaro is an 
opera buffa and was written 
in 1786. 
Franz Liszt was a 
Hungarian composer. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Liszt was a Hungarian artist of the Romantic Era. 
The Marriage of Figaro is an 
opera that takes place in 
Spain in the 18th century. 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart 
composed the Marriage of 
Figaro. 
A squirrel's nest is called 
a sett.  
A squirrel's nest is named as 
such, because squirrels 
never relocate their nests. 
Squirrels build nests out of 
twigs, dry leaves and grass.  
A squirrel’s nest is called a 
drey. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 2) This name was earned over 200 years ago 
Squirrels build nests to keep 
warm in the winter months. 
A badger’s nest is called a 
sett. 
The TGV (the French 
high-speed train) stands 
for Tactique 
Geographique Vierra. 
The TGV (the French high-
speed train) has had many 
names in the past. 
The TGV is France's 
intercity high-speed rail 
service, operated by the 
The TGV extends its service 
to Belgium, Germany, and 
even the Netherlands. 
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SNCF, the state-owned 
national rail operator.  
(55% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
The TGV started off with 
intercity transportation but 
expanded to international 
transportation. 
The TGV is a high-speed 
train that began operating in 
1981. 
The abbreviation TGV 
stands for a French saying 
that translates to high-speed 
train.  
The poker player Gus 
Hansen's nickname is 
Straightjack Gus. 
Gus Hansen was notorious 
for pulling straight's in 
tournaments.  
Gus Hansen is a famous 
Danish poker player who 
lives in Monaco. 
Gus Hansen was already a 
world class backgammon 
player. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 2)  
Earned this nickname after 
making a series of risky 
bluffs in his most famous 
tournament appearance. 
Gus Hansen has won three 
World Poker Tour open 
titles. 
Hansen regularly plays in 
the "Bobby's Room" at the 
Bellagio Casino in Las 
Vegas. 
Graham's number is a 
power tower of 2. 
A power tower often 
referred to as a tetration, is 
the next hyperoperation 
after exponentiation. 
Graham's number is an 
enormous number that arises 
as an upper bound on the 
answer of a problem in the 
mathematical field of 
Ramsey theory. 
There are 64 layers of 
power in Graham's number. 
(61% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Goldbach's conjecture states 
that every even integer is 
the sum of two primes and 
is true for numbers up to 
Graham's number. 
Mathematicians believe there 
is not enough space in the 
whole universe to jot down 
all of the digits of what is 
known as 'Graham's Number 
Graham's number is too big 
to write. 
The common name for 
Impatiens walleriana is 
Cuckooflower. 
The Cuckooflower name 
was earned after Cuckoo 
birds observed having an 
attraction to this flower. 
Impatiens walleriana is a 
decorative plant that is native 
to eastern Africa.  
The common name for 
Impatiens walleriana is 
Busy Lizzie. 
(83% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
The seedpod of Impatiens 
Walleriana explodes when 
ripe. 
Impatiens wallerianas do not 
thrive as well in harsh 
Cardamine pratensis is the 
scintific name for 
Cuckooflower. 
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sunlight so it is best to plant 
them in a shaded area. 
Germany won the 
Hockey World Cup in 
1975. 
Germany was an up and 
coming hockey team in the 
1970's 
The Hockey World Cup is an 
international field hockey 
competition organized by the 
International Hockey 
Federation.  
Germany won the Soccer 
World Cup in 1975. 
(44% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
1975 was the first year that 
Russia had not won the 
hockey world cup in 
decades. 
The first Hockey World Cup 
took place in 1971 in 
Pakistan. 
India won the Hockey 
World Cup in 1975. 
Victor Hugo is the author 
of Ben-Hur. 
Victor Hugo is a famous 
author from the 1900's who 
wrote over 100 novels. 
Ben-Hur is considered the 
most influential Christian 
book of the 19th century.  
Victor Hugo is most known 
for "The Hunchback of 
Notre-Dame". 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Ben-Hur was a novel that 
was later made into a movie 
in the 1950's. 
The main character in Ben-
Hur is Judah, a prince of 
Jerusalem who descended 
from a royal family of Judea.  
Lew Wallace is the author 
of the book Ben-Hur which 
later on was made into a 
film by William Wyler. 
Quercus is the Latin 
name of a Greek coin. 
The Greek translation for 
Quercus is known as the 
drachma.  
The first Greek coins were 
created in the 6th century in 
Aegina. 
There are about 600 species 
of Quercus. 
(61% acc, conf 1, plau 3) English translation for the Quercus is valuable metal. 
Rare ancient Greek coins can 
be worth a substantial 
amount of money. 
Quercus is the Latin name 
of a Greek tree. 
Spain is a landlocked 
country. 
Spain's neighboring 
countries are Portugal and 
France. 
There are currently 50 
countries in the world that 
are considered landlocked.  
Spain is famous for its 
seafood paella. 
(28% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Spain is a European country. 
Approximately one-fifth of 
the world's countries are 
landlocked and have no 
access to the oceans.  
Spain is located next to 
Portugal. 
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The Star of Africa is the 
largest blue diamond in 
the world at 45 carats and 
is said to be cursed. 
The Star of Africa was 
discovered at the Premier 
No.2 mine in Cullinan, 
South Africa 
The largest blue diamond in 
the world is said to bring 
misfortune and tragedy to 
any person who wears it.  
The Oppenheimer Blue is 
the world's largest blue 
diamond, it sold for $57.5 
million. 
(39% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
The Star of Africa doubles 
the size of any other 
discovered diamonds. 
The largest blue diamond in 
the world is worth about 
$350 million.  
The cullinan diamond is 
about 3,106.75 carats. 
The birthplace of the 
fictional detective 
Hercule Poirot is 
England. 
Hercule Poirot had a 
primarily English Influence.  
Hercule Poirot is a fictional 
detective created by Agatha 
Christie. 
The birthplace of the 
fictional detective Hercule 
Poirot is Belgium. 
(61% acc, conf 1, plau 2) 
Primarily, the fictional 
character Poirot operated 
out of the Brussels Police 
Force.  
Hercule Poirot is one of 
Agatha Christie's most 
famous characters, appearing 
in 33 novels and over 50 
short stories. 
The fictional detective 
Hercule Poirot is fluent in 
French. 
More than 10% of the 
world's Muslims live in 
Iran. 
Iran's official religion is 
Islam. 
Muslims are people who 
follow or practice Islam, a 
monotheistic Abrahamic 
religion. 
5.02% of Muslims live in 
the UK. 
(67% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
The middle east has the 
highest concentration of 
Muslims. 
Muslims are the second 
largest religious group in the 
world. 
More than 90% of Iranians 
are Shi'a. 
A Rhode Island Red is a 
breed of duck.  
The Rhode Island Red is a 
duck native only to Rhode 
Island.  
The Rhode Island Red was 
developed in the 19th 
century in Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island. 
A Rhode Island Red is a 
breed of chicken. 
(72% acc, conf 1, plau 2) Rhode Island Reds are a protected species of duck.  
The Rhode Island Red has a 
hardy temperament and is 
able to survive difficult 
conditions. 
A Rhode Island Red often 
has a reddish hue on the 
toes and sides of shanks. 
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In Star Trek, Captain 
Kirk's middle name is 
Thaddeus. 
Captain Kirk's middle name 
was selected after the planet 
he lived on. 
One of Captain Kirk's most 
popular catchphrases was 
"Beam me up." 
 Captain Kirk's last name is 
Thaddeus. 
(39% acc, conf 1, plau 3) Thaddeus is a planet in the Star Trek series. 
Captain Kirk was the captain 
of the starship USS 
Enterprise. 
Captain Kirk is a character 
in Star Wars. 
Sanskirpt is the earliest 
known writing system in 
the world. 
Sanskrit dates back to 3500 
years ago. 
The earliest known writing 
system was created by the 
Sumerians around 3200 BC. 
Egyptian hieroglyphics is 
the earliest known writing 
system. 
(39% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Sanskrit is a common 
language of ancient hindu 
philosophy. 
The earliest writing system is 
classified by wedge-shaped 
marks on clay tablets. 
Sanskrit is a language of 
ancient India. 
In the 1971 film Dirty 
Harry, Clint Eastwood's 
character's last name is 
Carnegie. 
Dirty Harry is an action-
crime thriller film. 
In the movie Dirty Harry, 
Clint Eastwood's character 
attempt to track down a 
psychopathic killer.  
In the 1971 film Dirty 
Harry, Clint Eastwood's 
character last name is 
Callahan. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Clint Eastwood is known 
for his roles in action 
movies. 
The movie Dirty Harry gave 
Clint Eastwood his most 
famous role. 
John Vernon plays the 
mayor in the 1971 film, 
Dirty Harry. 
Silver is the chemical 
element that has the 
atomic number of 79. 
Silver was moved multiple 
times on the periodic table. 
There is a total of 118 
chemical elements on the 
periodic table. 
The atomic number of silver 
is close to 46. 
(44% acc, conf 1, plau 3) 
Silver was not considered a 
chemical element in the first 
drafts of the periodic table. 
Silver is a soft, white 
transition metal and exhibits 
the highest electrical 
conductivity.  
Silver is chemical element 
with symbol Ag. 
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APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENT 2 STIMULI 
Awkward Target  
A jersey that is yellow in color is worn by the winning 
player of that stage during their next stage of the Tour de 
France for each stage. (wc 28) 
The winner of each stage of the Tour de France wears a 
yellow jersey in the next stage. (50% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 
18) 
The Tour de France is a competition that has many 
stages.   
Yellow jerseys are for winners of each stage.   
Belgium is the birthplace of Hercule Poirot, the fictional 
detective. (wc 10) 
The birthplace of the fictional detective Hercule Poirot is 
Belgium. (39% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 10) 
Hercule Poirot is a fictional detective.   
Hercule Poirot is from Belgium.   
Indonesia is the country in which there are more than 
10% of Muslim of the world live. (wc 17) 
More than 10% of the world's Muslims live in Indonesia. 
(72% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc10, wc 10) 
Some Muslims live in Indonesia.   
Muslims live around the world.   
Tetanus is a term, medical professionals use to refer to 
what is commonly known as lockjaw. (wc 16) 
The medical term for lockjaw is tetanus.  
(39% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 10, wc 7) 
Medical terms and common known names for illnesses 
are different.   
Lockjaw is Tetanus.   
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Captain Kirk is a character in a series called Star Trek 
and his middle name is Tiberius. (wc 17) 
In Star Trek, Captain Kirk's middle name is Tiberius.  
(67% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 9) 
Star Trek is a show with a character that goes by Captain 
Kirk.   
Captain Kirk's middle name is Tiberius.   
The character Max Headroom was portrayed by an actor 
named Matt Frewer. (wc 12) 
Matt Frewer portrayed the character Max Headroom.  
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 7) 
Matt Frewer is an actor.   
There was a show that had a character named Max 
Headroom.   
Matt Frewer portrayed Max Headroom.   
On a modern piano, the keys add up to a total of 88 keys. 
(wc 14) 
There are a total of 88keys on a modern piano.  
(83% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 11) 
The modern piano has many keys.   
Pianos from different periods have different number of 
keys.   
There are 88 keys on a modern piano.   
Britain has a prime minister who has an official residence 
and the address for which the prime minister resides in is 
10 downing Street. (wc 24) 
10 Downing street is the official address for Britain's prime 
minister. 
(50% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 11) 
Britain has a prime minister.   
There is a designated residence location for the prime 
minister.   
10 Downing street is where the British Prime Minister 
lives.   
Loise Bourgeois is a sculptor who made a sculpture of a 
spider and named it Mamam. (wc 16) 
Mamam by Loise Bourgeois is a sculpture of a spider.  
(17% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 10) 
Mamam is a sculpture of a spider.   
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Loise Bourgeois is a sculptor.   
Loise Bourgeois sculpted Mamam.   
Taught a new way to dance by Forrest Gump, Ginger 
Rogers was portrayed in the film Forrest Gump. (wc 18)  
In the film Forrest Gump, Forrest taught Ginger Rogers a 
new way to dance. (56% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 14) 
Ginger Rogers is someone who dances.   
Forrest Gump is a film.   
Forrest Gump is based on a period when Ginger Rogers 
was alive.   
The person who founded the Scout Movement was 
Winston Churchill. (wc 10) 
Winston Churchill was the founder of the Scout Movement. 
(61% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 9) 
Winston Churchill founded the Scout Movement.   
Winston Churchill was a scout.   
The scout movement is a political movement.   
David Howell Evans is more widely known by his stage 
name: The Cliff. (wc 13) 
Widely known by his stage name, David Howell Evans is 
The Cliff. (61% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 12) 
David Howell Evans has a stage name.   
The Cliff' is a stage name.   
David Howell Evans is a performer on stage,   
For Impatient wallerina, Cuckooflower is the common 
name. (wc 8) 
The common name for Impatiens walleriana is 
Cuckooflower. (83% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 8) 
Impatiens walleriana is a plant.   
Cuckooflower is a common name for plants.   
Plants have different names.   
Gus Hansen is the poker player that is nicknamed 
Straightjack Gus. (wc 11) 
The poker player Gus Hansen's nickname is Straightjack 
Gus. (56 % acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 9) 
Gus Hansen is a poker player.   
The Straightjack Gus is a nickname.   
Gus Hansen got his nickname from playing poker.   
 
 
 
117 
Diamond can be translated into Greek, which means 
priceless in the Greek word. (wc 13) 
The Greek word for diamond means priceless.  
(39% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 7) 
Diamond can be translated into Greek.   
Diamonds are priceless.   
Being Earth's highest point of its continental crust is a 
characteristic of K2. (wc 13) 
K2 is the highest point on the Earth's continental crust. 
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 10) 
K2 is a mountain.   
Mountains are the highest points on the Earth's 
continental crust.   
The Benedictine monk Moscatto was the person who 
invented the champagne Moscatto. (wc 12) 
Moscatto was the Benedictine monk who invented 
champagne. (28% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 8) 
Moscatto was a Benedictine monk.   
Champagne is known to have been invented by 
Benedictine monks.    
In 73 seconds, a flight was broken apart on January 
28,1986 which was called the Space Shuttle Mercury. 
(wc 19) 
Space Shuttle Mercury broke apart 73 seconds into its flight 
on January 28, 1986. (50% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 14) 
The Space Shuttle Mercury was a space aircraft.   
On January 28, 1986, a space aircraft broke apart.   
In2006, Pluto became reclassified as a dwarf planet. (wc 
9) 
In 2006, Pluto became reclassified as a dwarf planet.  
(61% acc, conf 3, plau 3, wc 9) 
Pluto was not a dwarf planet before 2006.    
There are more than one classification for planets.   
Mozart composed “The Marriage of Figaro”. (wc 7) 
Mozart composed “The Marriage of Figaro”.  
(44% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 7) 
Mozart is a composer.   
The Marriage of Figaro is an Opera.   
Cuneiform script is the earliest known writing system in 
the world. (wc 11) 
Cuneiform script is the earliest known writing system in the 
world. (50% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 11) 
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Cuneiform script is a type of writing system.   
There are many different writing systems in the world.   
The oldest form of writing is Cuneiform script.   
Gold is the chemical element that has the atomic number 
of 79. (wc 12) 
Gold is the chemical element that has the atomic number of 
79. (44% acc, conf 2, plau 3, wc 12) 
Gold is a chemical element.   
Chemical elements have atomic numbers.   
There are more than 79 atomic elements.    
Catherine of Aragon was Henry VIII's first wife. (wc 8) 
Catherine of Aragon was Henry VIII's first wife.  
(56% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 8) 
Henry VIII was a king.   
Kings have many wives.   
Catherine of Aragon was the first wife of Henry VIII.   
A squirrel’s nest is called a sett. (wc 7) 
A squirrel’s nest is called a sett. (56% acc, conf 1, plau 2, 
wc 7) 
Squirrels live in nests.   
Sett is a squirrel's nest.   
In a rainbow, orange is at the outer part of the arch. (wc 
12) 
In a rainbow, orange is at the outer part of the arch. (44% 
acc, conf 2, plau 4, wc 12) 
Rainbows have different colors on each arch.   
Orange is a color.   
There are many layers to a rainbow.   
White tea has the least amount of caffeine among the 
types of tea. (wc 13) 
White tea has the least amount of caffeine among the types 
of tea. (50% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 13) 
Tea contains caffeine.   
White tea is a type of tea.   
The nearest island country to Puerto Rico is Trinidad. 
(wc 9) 
The nearest island country to Puerto Rico is Trinidad.  
(17% acc, conf 1, plau 3, wc 9) 
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Trinidad is an island country.   
Puerto Rico is an island country.   
Puerto Rico and Trinidad are close to each other.   
In Dutch folklore, Baoman the giant was defeated by a 
young Roman soldier Brabo. (wc 14) 
In Dutch folklore, Baoman the giant was defeated by a 
young Roman soldier Brabo. (17% acc, conf 1, plau 2, wc 
14) 
Baomann is a giant.   
Brabo is a young Roman soldier.   
Dutch folklore includes giants and soldiers.   
 
 
